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CHANGES, ANTICIPATIONS, AND REPARATIONS
Saul Levmore*
Conventional views of legal change emphasize the values of certainty and
reliance,and are therefore hostile to explicitly retroactivelaws. Contemporary
scholarship,however, allows that a policy of aggressive legal change, with no
compensationfor "new losers," can encourage socially useful steps in anticipation of change. ProfessorLevmore argues that the anticipation-oriented
approach logically extends to embrace anticipation by "new winners" and
governments as well as new losers. If all parties' anticipatory incentives are
considered,familiarrules, rangingfrom statutes of limitations to retroactivity and to compensatorypaymentsfor government takings, seem quite sensible. And if these rules are drawn correctly, few partiesshouldfind it worthwhile to stand against progress. Professor Levmore then considers
reparations. He argues that these payments by governments are made when
the potential anticipation effects normally associated with retroactive compensation are absent. The transfers are then redistributive, and best understood through interest group analysis.
INTRODUCTION

Most of the effort expended in understanding and reforming law is
concerned with the content of rules, be they substantive or procedural.
My interest here is instead ith timing. Law may be good enough,
whether it is made in courts or more democratic institutions, but it may
be too slow in coming about. Various interests and values may work to
impede the rate at which good law emerges. This Article offers an early
(but not quite first) step toward thinking about the many -ways that law
can and should influence its own development. If we allow ourselves to
be more modest about our ability to know the content of good law, but
less shy about encouraging parties to accept and facilitate changes that
various empowered majorities send our wvay, then the roles played by such
diverse things as due process, statutes of limitations, administrative
rulemaking, appeals, and government compensation take on new meaning. And from a more positive perspective, we might simply try to understand transition rules, broadly construed, as reflecting law's optimistic assumptions about its own substance. My focus is on incentives to
anticipate or arrest legal change.
* William B. Graham Professor of Law, University of Chicago. I am grateful for
suggestions received from Rachel Cantor, Julie Roin, Cass Sunstein, and participants at
workshops at Case Western, Loyola (Los Angeles), and the University of Chicago Law
Schools.
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The guiding principles on matters relating to transition rules have
traditionally been the values associated with certainty and reliance, and
indeed we might think of the conventional analysis of legal transitions as
"reliance-oriented" and as harboring hostility to explicitly retroactive
laws.' Contemporary work, however, has drawn attention to the idea that
these values might be in conflict with faith in legal change and with encouraging desirable change.2 The suggestion is that transition rules be
"anticipation-oriented," designed to encourage parties to anticipate new
law.3 Compensation or other softeners for those who are disadvantaged
by change will diminish the desirable inclination of these parties to anticipate change. Instrumentalist arguments have, of course, advanced the
possibility that government compensation in the wake of change might
generate better law through some sort of internalization process. 4 But
the present focus is on compensation and other tools as means of affecting the pace of change, rather than as implements for influencing the
content of new law. Anticipation can increase the value of changes.
It is often easy to see the sense of this insight. If, for example, regulators ban a chemical that had long been used in a manufacturing process,
the affected manufacturers might try to gain compensation, exemption
from suit for the past use of this input, delay in the effective date of the
ban, or exemption for those who like themselves (might be
"grandfathered" as having) relied on the legality of this chemical in the
past. Retroactive application will certainly be fought by these "new
losers," as I will call them, and so aggressive an introduction of change
might indeed seem especially unfair and pointless, for it would generate
liability for actions that can no longer be altered and that may indeed
have been approved by some regulatory authority. But the new, anticipation-oriented approach to legal transitions emphasizes the possibility that
1. See Charles B. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of

Retroactive Legislation, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 692, 692-93 (1960); Stephen R. Munzer,
Retroactive Law, 6 J. Legal Stud. 373, 391 (1977); Elmer E. Smead, The Rule Against
Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Principle of Jurisprudence, 20 Minn. L. Rev. 775, 777
(1936); Andrew C. Weiler, Note, Has Due Process Struck Out? The Judicial
Rubberstamping of Retroactive Economic Laws, 42 Duke L.J. 1069, 1116-17 (1993). For
representative examples of judicial decisions and academic commentary referring to
unsettling retroactive laws as monstrous, unjust, and the like, see Harold J. Krent, The
Puzzling Boundary Between Criminal and Civil Retroactive Lawmaking, 84 Geo. L.J. 2143,
2144-45 (1996).
2. See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, When Rules Change: An Economic and Political Analysis
of Transition Relief and Retroactivity (forthcoming Mar. 2000) (manuscript on file with
Columbia Law Review); Michael Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in
Income Tax Revision, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 47, 47 (1977); Louis Kaplow, An Economic
Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 509, 519 (1986); Saul Levmore, The Case for
Retroactive Taxation, 22J. Legal Stud. 265, 267 (1993) [hereinafter Levmore, Retroactive
Taxation].
3. In the tax context, however, often it is best if taxpayers do not anticipate new law so
that anticipation does not affect their behavior. See Kaplow, supra note 2, at 519.
4. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Simple Rules for a Complex World 129 (1995);
Kaplow, supra note 2, at 567-69.
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these manufacturers could have anticipated the ban. They might have
been in an excellent position to know the costs and benefits of the inputs
they used and in a relatively good position to anticipate new and better
law. The obvious way to encourage such anticipation and acceleration of
5
beneficial change is for the law to practice "aggressive change." Manufacturers who expect no protection from the costs of change will then do
well to anticipate it. They might, for example, develop and adopt substitutes for the chemicals that they anticipate will be banned, and good
change may come about in this way long before lawmakers know to
change the law.8 While the old, or conventional, view emphasized reliance interests and occasional cost internalization, the new approach focuses on anticipation. 7 Aggressive change is thus an anticipation-oriented strategy. It refers to the idea of imposing new law as if we were
confident of its quality and disappointed that we did not find it earlier. It
encourages relevant parties to anticipate new law by declining to compensate them for the costs they incur as the result of change.
This anticipation-oriented approach has its problems but there is obviously much to be said for it. Aggressive change is more attractive the
more new law is in fact good law, the more this good law would have been
yet better if enacted or conformed to earlier, the more new losers have
informational advantages, and the more likely it is that new losers will
facilitate good law rather than work wastefully or successfully to block it.
But my aim in this Article is not to dwell on the conditions under which
the strategy of aggressive change will be most successful, but rather to
extend this strategy and to increase the emphasis on anticipatory behavior. Rules of liability and even retroactivity may well encourage conventional tort defendants and regulated industries to anticipate new law, but
they may also encourage plaintiffs, regulators, and governments to do the
same. New law comes about through the interaction of all such parties,
and perhaps all should be encouraged with appropriate incentives regarding any failures of anticipation.
Part I suggests that this anticipation-oriented strategy offers a surprising insight that may explain a good deal of the law requiring government
5. The example in the text involves technological change, with a private party
possessing not only superior information but also the ability to effect change. In such
cases, the argument for what I call "aggressive change" is most straightforward.
6. In the extreme, there might be cases where self-regulation would be the norm and
a formal ban never comes to pass.
7. On cost internalization, see Hochman, supra note 1, at 692, 698. The strategy of
aggressive change is fueled by some skepticism about internalization strategies. A
government that pays for the costs it imposes does not always enjoy corresponding benefits
and does not always have an easy means of encouraging its agents to consider the costs for
which it will be responsible. Moreover, as a predictive matter the internalization idea raises
more problems than it solves in takings law, where the government pays but occasionally
and where these occasions are not correlated with the likelihood of complete
internalization. In any event, I will treat a "strategy of aggressive change" and an
'anticipation-oriented" approach as virtually synonymous.
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payments in some situations. The law that we experience may in fact be
more compatible with the strategy of aggressive change than with the old,
reliance-oriented approach. In order to encourage anticipatory behavior
by multiple parties, the best transition rules may be those that impose
change rather mildly-not because of any sense of caution about the content of new law, nor because of sympathy for those who relied on old law,
but because these rules offer good incentives for all concerned. At the
same time, there may be discrete areas of law where more aggressive
change is appropriate. Some readers will come away from this exploration of the logic of an anticipation-oriented approach more convinced
than before that it is a mistake to impose change aggressively and that the
strategy of aggressive change crumbles under its own weight. My own
conclusion is at times agnostic and at times optimistic about both the
strategy of aggressive change and conventional legal rules.
Extension of the aggressive-change strategy to include the goals of
encouraging anticipation by opposing private parties and by governments
draws attention to instances where governments do make compensatorystyle payments after serious legal changes. In Part II, I consider a category of rather extreme examples, in which monetary reparations are paid
long after injuries are suffered and long after a regretted legal regime has
been changed.
A good recent example of reparations following social and legal regret of a very serious sort was the payment of $20,000 each to some 82,000
Japanese Americans (or their immediate relatives) who had been relocated and interned during World War 11.8 It goes almost without saying
that other transformations have not generated reparations. African
Americans who experienced discrimination and government-sponsored
segregation, not to mention earlier enslavement, have not received direct
reparations, despite intermittent arguments and claims for monetary payments.9 At a slightly more mundane level, many government programs,
experiments, and military campaigns come to seem misguided and unjustifiable, but only a fraction of these generate reparative payments. There
may be something of a parallel positive puzzle with respect to international reparations which sometimes follow wars or regrettable state actions-and with remarkable speed. A theory that makes sense of the pat8. I will try to reserve the term "reparations" for payments made by governments to
injured parties who have no reasonable expectation of recovery in court. These legislated
payments are thus different from settlements. In the case of the payments to Japanese
Americans, recipients were required to waive any claims they might have had against the
government. I think it fair to say that the expected value of these claims was very low or, at
least, that sudden success in the courts would itself have come only with the help of
political sentiment and have been at odds with existing law. On the details of the
reparations scheme itself, see Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 U.S.C. § 1989b-4 (1994).
9. See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 (9th Cir. 1995). See generally
Vincene Verdun, If the Shoe Fits, Wear It: An Analysis of Reparations to African
Americans, 67 Tul. L. Rev. 597 (1993).
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tern of domestic reparations might illuminate the incidence of
international payments.
My claim about reparations can be summarized (in nearly circular
fashion) through the observation that the reasons for denying compensation with respect to most legal changes are inapplicable in the very situations where reparations are paid. Put differently, reparations involve
wealth transfers where the behavioral, or potential anticipation, effects
normally associated with compensation related to legal change are absent. The transfers are then redistributive, political moves best understood through interest group analysis. The ability to change law without
compensating losers may normally encourage desirable legal change, but
it will not do so if the compensation claim comes so long after the original regime that it could scarcely have been anticipated, or if its expected
costs are very low.
I. AGGRESSIVE LEGAL CHANGE

A. EncouragingAnticipation by New Losers
Most, if not all, of the attention paid recently to legal changes, or
transitions, has been devoted to claims by those who stand to lose from
change.10 These new losers regularly point to their reliance on old law
and argue not only against retroactive application of new law1 but also
for compensation or protection to the extent that there are burdens associated with change that is nominally prospective. If, for example, courts
or other regulators begin to find that products once declared safe are
now thought to be defective, there are questions about who should bear
the cost of changing a manufacturing process as well as the costs associated with injuries imposed, or yet to be caused, by these old products.
Comparable questions arise with many legislative pronouncements. One
favorite in the literature is losses imposed by a repeal of the federal income tax exemption for interest on municipal bonds; the exemption has
long been abhorred by tax law theorists and its repeal can be fantasized
in various forms with different degrees of retroactivity.' 2
Recent, interesting literature suggests that, whatever the doctrinal
context, normative views about protection for new losers follow from assumptions or intuitions about the likelihood that legislative and judicial
10. See Graetz, supra note 2, at 49-51; Kaplow, supra note 2, at 522; Levmore,
Retroactive Taxation, supra note 2, at 266-67.
11. See, e.g., Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 759 (1995); James B.
Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 536 (1991); Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404
U.S. 97, 107 (1971).
12. See, e.g., Graetz, supra note 2, at 53-56. This example is not among the strongest
for aggressive change because taxpayers (and even municipalities) are unlikely to have an
informational advantage about the case for change. On the other hand, although this
Article emphasizes the role that information advantages can play in the argument for a
strategy of aggressive change, informational advantage is not a focus of the extant
literature.
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innovations offer improvements. If new law is good law, then there is
normally much to be said for encouraging both new law and the behavior
it means to animate. Such encouragement is the goal of a policy of aggressive change; protection for new losers will only weaken their motivation to anticipate change. Moreover, the heroic assumption that new law
is more often than not good law, not to mention the implicit assumption
that encouraging a different pace of change will not adversely affect its
content,13 may be optimistic but it is not capricious. It is plausible, for
example, that although selfish interest groups and legislators get their
way with respect to novel issues, the longer a matter is in the public eye,
the more likely some combination of good judgment, majoritarian politics, and market-like bargains will prevail. 14 With market-style bargaining
always in the shadows, most legal rules might well come to be sensible or
even efficient. It almost follows that most change is for the better. Alternatively, there may be a kind of competitive theory that can ground optimism about the evolution ofjudicial and legislative interventions. Better
governments may help their industries and citizens win various interjurisdictional battles against inferior and less responsive governments. In
short, although there is an endless stream of pessimistic arguments about
the likely character of laws, there may be a comparable-less familiar but
arguments supporting the idea that
perhaps superior-set of optimistic
15
most new law is good law.
An alternative entry point to thinking about the pace of change and
anticipatory behavior, as opposed to the content of new law, is to begin
with the question of how to encourage parties to anticipate and facilitate
good law. Parties who find the content of proposed laws disadvantageous
are at present likely to oppose and delay change. One possibility is to
inquire constantly whether any party was negligent or worse in its attempts to change law or forestall changes. The difficulties associated with
this sort of approach lead to the objective strategy of taking the evolution
of the content of law as a given. The idea is to assume that law as it
develops is the best law, having survived a kind of evolutionary competition. There is then no need to make subjective judgments about good
and bad law, except perhaps in rare cases where law responds to new
circumstances that individual actors could not or even should not try to
13. Note that the interaction between pace and content is unlikely to present much of
a problem. Rushing things along might sometimes lead to errors, but these mistakes will in
turn be discouraged by knowledge that corrections will eventually be imposed aggressively
under the rules associated with an anticipation-oriented regime.

14. Indeed, it is something of a puzzle that commentators who have the most faith in
private bargains (even in the face of transaction costs) tend to be those with the least faith
in private parties' abilities to bargain successfully for efficient outcomes in the political
arena. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 3.1, at 37-38, § 19.3, at
572-73 (5th ed. 1998).
15. There is something attractive about avoiding the question of asking some
institution to identify good law versus bad law.
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anticipate.1 6 There is obviously much more that could be said about this
notion, but my strategy here is to focus on timing and to assume a good
deal about content
In any event, if one is willing to assume that new law is more often
than not good law, or at least to see where this sort of leaping lands us,
then there is much to be said for the proposition, associated with Louis
Kaplow, Dan Shaviro, and others, that there should be no protection for
those who lose because of substantive change.' 7 What is said to be at
stake is not simply a question of wealth distribution but rather the incentive to predict change and to exploit informational advantages in ways
that promote the social interest. Imagine, again, that new legislation bars
the use of some chemical inputs or that new administrative regulations
hold users responsible for injuries caused by these ingredients. The more
aggressive the expected application of these new rules, the more it seems
likely that well-informed firms will choose to substitute other, less harmful inputs even before the government (through courts, regulators, or
legislatures) devises the new controls. The idea, once more, is that it will
pay for firms to anticipate government regulation in order to avoid liability or wasted investments. Moreover, there is reason to think that these
regulated firms know or could know more than the government about
likely subjects of regulatory concern and, therefore, might be in the best
position to forecast the coming, good law. In contrast, if the law is such
that these firms know that they will be compensated for the cost of legal
change, then they have little incentive to anticipate new law. The case for
aggressive change is much weaker where the parties that might anticipate
new law have no special informational advantage, if only because it is
much more likely that they will waste resources in their attempts to acquire information in the hands of others.' 8
There is, to be sure, the possibility that the law might encourage useful anticipation by asking ex post, and on a case-by-case basis, when various actors should have anticipated what the lawmakers eventually discovered. The idea is that even if we assume the desirability of new law, we
may be willing to inquire in each case whether anticipation was feasible,
whether various parties enjoyed superior information, and even whether

16. It is possible that anticipation should sometimes be discouraged in order to
economize on duplicative information gathering.
17. Or at least because of substantive or policy changes. See Shaviro, supra note 2
(manuscript at 8) (striving to distinguish policy-relevant attributes from those that are
"accounting" conventions); Kaplow, supra note 2, at 513.
18. The case does not evaporate when there is no informational advantage because
these parties may still usefully adapt to coming law. And the problem of duplicative
searches for information is common in many markets. Consumers and investors, for
example, regularly face collective action problems that suggest the presence of something
other than the optimal amount of comparison shopping and other searching, but it is
unlikely that there is much of a case to be made for law's intervening in all such markets.
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there was antisocial obstruction of good change. 19 Such a scheme might
call for payments for the period in which there was negligent or intentional non-anticipatory behavior. We might simply think of the case for
fairly aggressive legal change as a kind of argument for strict liability for
non-anticipation, where a negligence rule is expensive to administer. In
any event, the choice between negligence and strict liability can be revisited if the strategy of aggressive legal change ever becomes conventional.
An intermediate strategy would allow room for categories of
changes, and in particular would attempt to identify changes in law that
arise because of new circumstances that make early anticipation unlikely
or even undesirable. Thus, when a speed limit is reduced on a highway, it
is likely that anticipatory precautions may be inefficient, because in a
much earlier period there was insufficient congestion to warrant the
lower speed, or even dangerous, because of a collective action problem
that is solved rather uniquely by a posted speed limit.20 New law may be

good law, but only in its time. 21 In contrast, airbags might have been
usefully anticipated long before their actual introduction. There is,
therefore, something to be said for case-by-case determinations as to
whether change would have been appropriate earlier. On the other
hand, there is the possibility of useful generalization. One possibility is to

generalize based on regulatory subject. 22 Another is to treat decisions by
19. Further refinements might include the question of whether a reasonable party
might have thought that others were investing in information. That problem becomes
similar to that encountered in rescue law. See Saul Levmore, Waiting for Rescue: An Essay
on the Evolution and Incentive Structure of the Law of Affirmative Obligations, 72 Va. L.
Rev. 879, 934 (1986).

20. There can be danger in driving as if the speed limit were lower than posted when
others do not do the same. In any event, I do not put too much weight on the collective
action point because I doubt that much changes if we use an example where the speed
limit changes on a railroad line used by one or two carriers. Finally, note that anticipation
could also be encouraged with subsidies or penalties targeted at behavior that is a
substitute for that which the law eventually chooses. If congestion leads to lower speed
limits, some of those who usefully anticipated the legal change will drive a bit slower but
some will switch to other routes or modes of transportation. We might penalize those who
do not (or reward those who do) anticipate and perform these useful acts. The problem is
that it can be difficult to specify all those things that are substitutes for the behavior
eventually legislated.
21. We might imagine transition rules that vary according to the underlying
substantive rule. Thus, new speed limits might be retroactively imposed for a six-month
period to take account of the lag between new density and traffic conditions and the
passage of new speed limits by legislation or administrative rulemaking. The public choice
implications are fairly clear and not necessarily upsetting. Old speeders-as defined by
new law-will not normally be known except for those who were involved in accidents
during the six-month period. These parties will have a keen interest in opposing the new
legislation, while their victims will have an interest in supporting lower speed limits in
order to facilitate victories in tort suits. And it is possible that these interested and
comparably situated parties are well-suited adversaries in the political arena.
22. Thus, new traffic and new zoning laws might be presumed to be based on new
circumstances while product safety rules might be presumed to reflect technological
advances or data collection that might have been usefully anticipated. But even these
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legislators or administrative agencies as more likely than those of courts
to result from recently changed contexts, if only because the former can
move more quickly.
Even with a convenient assumption about the quality of the content
of new law, the argument for aggressive legal change is open to important
objections and qualifications. It must assume that negatively affected parties can be discouraged from delaying good law, or that they are unable
to succeed in such obstruction. After all, if new losers simply go uncompensated for the burdens new law imposes on them, then they can be
expected to work to delay the implementation of proposed changes. One
way to combat this delay and to promote the anticipation-oriented strategy is to insist that legal change should be accompanied by retroactive
liability where necessary, in order to ensure that new losers will not waste
resources seeking to promote destructive delay. In some settings law encourages anticipation and discourages intentional delay by awarding prejudgment interest as well as by imposing retroactive liability,23 and the
same strategy can be followed even where new losers were proclaimed to
be winners under old law. The problem is more difficult when new law
affects things that are not easily monetized. In any event, the strategy of
aggressive change requires not only the very optimistic assumption that
most changes are good but also the sanguine conjecture that we need not
be concerned about the social costs associated with delays in change
brought about through the influence of those who will lose from it. Indeed, a vulnerability of the anticipation-oriented approach discussed thus
far is that it gives new losers a new (and unfortunate) incentive to block
change entirely.
The preceding analysis is, however, unnecessarily wooden. In fact, a
legal system guided by the value of anticipatory behavior need not
precommit either to the noncompensation norm or to a rule requiring
compensation (or other protection) for those who relied on old law.
Courts may react to new law and subsequent claims by new losers by allowing change, and even nominally retroactive change, with no protection for new losers-but nothing stops legislatures from providing compensation where none is legally required. Legislatures, more than courts,
can engage in the strategic and selective protection of new losers. A plausible, but admittedly blissful, view is that where losers have sufficient
power to delay or block desirable change, winners (including the polity as
examples might be trivialized with the claim that virtually everything can be usefully
anticipated. Thus, property owners might usefully anticipate zoning changes-but then
again perhaps we have no reason to expect them to anticipate where governments choose
to put new industrial parks or military bases.
23. See City of Milwaukee v. Cement Div., Nat'l Gypsum Co., 515 U.S. 189, 194 (1995)
(discussing prejudgment interest in the context of admiralty law); General Motors Corp. v.
Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 654 (1983) (discussing prejudgment interest in the context of
patent infringement); United States ex rel. Treat Bros. Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 986
F.2d 1110, 1120 (7th Cir. 1993) (discussing prejudgment interest in the context of breach
of contract).
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a whole) find it worthwhile to compensate losers in order to go forward
with good new law. Good law is to be expected under this view, but it will
sometimes come with a political cost in the form of compensation for
losers, or for a potent subset of losers. It goes almost without saying that
such political deals must (at least sometimes) be enforceable for them to
have any value. If aggressive change is applied everywhere, even to undo
previous compensation payments to new losers, then political bargains to
facilitate change will depend on the development of a norm against this
sort of aggressive undoing of earlier deals. If this norm does not develop,
if compensation were somehow impermissible in the first place, or if it
were required to be disbursed with some principled consistency, then it is
quite plausible that there would be less good change and good law than
there would be in a world where selective protection was permissible or
24
even in one where reliance interests were always protected.
There is, of course, ample room for the pessimistic view that begins
with the intuition that new law is often bad law. Political agents may be
selfish and uncontrollable. Bargains may be missed because of transaction costs, because potential winners and losers cannot easily convert
their rights to money or other tradable goods, because the potential for
payments may lead to extortion, inefficient posturing, and so forth. Such
pessimism leads to a taste for less government flexibility in order to avoid
political bargains for further changes. But the pessimistic view tends to
conflate problems of timing and content, and my aim is to focus on the
former even if it means (unrealistically) holding the latter constant or
assuming the best about it. To put the entire matter differently, the best
argument for mandating government compensation for all those who
lose from change-which is to treat most regulations as compensable takings-may not be that compensation will encourage better governmental
decisionmaking but rather that the permissible and flexible character of
compensation in the absence of a mandatory rule leads to wasteful rent25
seeking by those who now seek to ward off uncompensated regulation.
Our legal system, and surely most others, reflects an intuition that
the promise of compensation for new losers would do more harm than
24. This flexibility advances the optimistic case alluded to above. See supra note 13
and accompanying text If endowments (and even legal rules) do not matter much in
private law because trades will occur where they are profitable, then the same might be
true even where voting rights, interest groups, and other political arrangements create the
need for an extra layer of costily transactions. The flexibility of law, in the form of the
power to compensate or not, often creates more bargaining room.
25. Note that if we focus on timing or the process of change, and concern ourselves
entirely with such things as rent-seeking, there is a strong case to be made for mandatory
compensation to new losers. The idea is that if there is no compensation, then prospective
losers will fight change. And if compensation is discretionary, then they will fight change
or work to gain compensation. The only way to avoid rent-seeking entirely is to guarantee
compensatory payments (but no more) in the event of change. This is, of course, neither
the position taken here nor one already associated with the strategy of aggressive change.
See infra Part II.C (discussing other flawed strategies for reducing rent-seeking).
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good except under special circumstances, such as the singling out of a
particular individual or group. New legislation is normally associated
with new winners and new losers; the former group has often been instrumental in encouraging the legislative change, and the latter group generally receives no compensation. The system operates through political
power rather than unanimity or a Paretian ideal.
The discussion thus far has emphasized legal change through legislation, but the case for encouraging anticipation by new losers is much the
same whether changes come about in legislatures or in courts.2 6 The winners and losers in court cases are not unlike those found in the wake of
new legislation. When a court surprises us by finding liability where none
was known before, we expect the moving party to be one of the winners,
and it is rewarded by a judgment against its opponent, a new (and perhaps lone) loser. The loser is hardly compensated even though there is a
sense in which the government (through the courts) has taken from it.
There is again the question of useful anticipation. Continuing with the
example of potential tortfeasors who should rush to take precautions that
future courts will eventually find to be desirable, one can imagine a system in which past litigants, who failed to collect when they had their day
in court, collect on the basis of new law in order to encourage anticipation by the new losers. But prior to exploring this possibility, I turn to
more explicit consideration of the role of new winners.
B. EncouragingAnticipation (Even) by New Winners

The anticipation-oriented approach to new losers, which is to say the
idea of fully burdening them with the costs of change, is most attractive
where these players, who are often conventional defendants, have both
an informational advantage in anticipating changes (in law and technology) and the ability to take concrete, socially useful steps. However, new
losers are not the only parties whose anticipation or advance behavior
might be usefully encouraged. This is easier to see if we characterize the
strategy of aggressive change as aimed not simply at anticipation but,
more generally, at facilitation of new rules and associated behavior. Anticipation (and new law itself) is simply a means to the desirable end of
27
new and better behavior.
We might, therefore, stand the discussion thus far (and the recent
literature on legal transitions) on its head by encouraging new winners to
26. This is recognized by Kaplow, supra note 2, at 614-15. Note, however, that the
entire discussion of prejudgment interest, see supra note 23 and accompanying text,
provides an example ofjudge-made law exhibiting remarkable awareness of the problem
of delay by those who expect to be new losers.
27. I put the point in purely instrumentalist terms in order to avoid repetition. Much
of what is said in the text could also be attached to claims about other goals of law. If, for
example, one prefers to think of the role of law in seeking to promote communal values or
an attractive distribution of resources, then private anticipation and facilitation might still
be usefully encouraged exactly as discussed in the text.

HeinOnline -- 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1667 1999

1668

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99:1657

anticipate change or, more accurately, the potential for change, and to
facilitate and argue effectively for improvements in both courts and legislative hallways. There will be contexts where new winners might do well
to take concrete steps that are quite similar to those now expected of new
losers. Accident reduction might, for instance, call for a new loser to
invest in some precaution, but it might also require apparent winners
(who will collect for old losses) to take some precautionary steps that are
costly because of their own earlier reliance on old law. But the easiest
and most common case to think of is where "real" change is in the hands
of the new losers and the role of new winners is to litigate or lobby. The
obvious, or parallel, way to encourage this facilitation by new winners is to
penalize its absence. Much as new losers were encouraged (at least by the
logic of the strategy of aggressive change) with retroactive liability and
the like, new winners can in turn be encouraged by the law's withholding
of the normal rewards that change bestows on new winners. Put differently, an anticipation-oriented approach applied only to the disadvantage
of new losers would increase the rewards to new winners; this may be
unwise and inconsistent with the strategy of aggressive change. Those
who do not bring claims, or do not argue effectively for change, might
lose through the simple expedient of putting a limit on our retroactive
28
impulses with respect to their adversaries.
The first blossoming of the anticipation-oriented strategy was too
limited in its focus on new losers. The strategy, as a matter of both logic
and practice, should be applied in a way that reflects the fact that legal
change often results from the work of multiple actors. Much as anticipation by new losers might be encouraged through the aggressive imposition of new rules, with no compensation, some retroactive liability, and so
forth, so too new winners might be encouraged to bring these changes
about through limits on their victories. Ideally, the errors associated with
old law might be divided between new winners and losers in a manner
designed to encourage optimal efforts on both sides in anticipating and
bringing about new, improved law. There will surely be situations where
new winners are as important or even more important than new losers in
facilitating change. The idea of aggressive change applies as much to
plaintiffs and analogous legislative supplicants as to defendants and other
new losers. New winners can also be asked to anticipate new law and to
come forward with their claims earlier rather than later. There is no reason to expect everything of new losers. And the easy way to encourage
anticipatory, early claims against the status quo is to limit the retroactive
28. There are also other ways of encouraging new winners. The law might allow
winners to collect from new losers but might pay rewards to new winners as a kind of
incentive to facilitate legal change. Similar subsidies might be used to encourage new
losers. But my aim here is not to explore the various strategies forjoint optimization. And
my argument sticks with the conventional practice of using liability for damages as a
convenient tool and suggests that this liability might be divided among all those parties
whose anticipation is sought.
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impulses suggested by the first wave of thinking about an anticipationoriented approach to legal change.
C. Litigation and Legislation (and Rules of Civil Procedure)
An anticipation-oriented approach is consistent with rules long associated with change through litigation. These familiar rules encourage
new losers by holding them liable for some past losses that could have
been avoided with better anticipation. At the same time, statutes of limitations confine this liability and thereby encourage new theories and an29
ticipation by new winners.
Imagine, for instance, that A sues X and loses but that B is successful
later on when she brings a similar (but non-precluded) suit against Y,
with parallel facts but with an improved theory or new safety technology
at B's disposal.30 An anticipation-oriented view of litigation is that aggressive retroactivity is appropriate; Y should pay for past behavior even
though judges in the past thought that X's comparable behavior did not
call for the imposition of liability. Y might have been in the best position
to know whether it was reasonable to rely on the judgment in favor of X.
The anticipation goal might also suggest reopening the case between A
and X, although we may want to abide by some version of preclusion
doctrine if there is some benefit to case-by-case signaling along the way.
We might, for example, only go so far as to allow claimants other than A
to recover against X for X's past actions. X's early success is at least partially undone because X itself is in a good position to know how strongly
it should rely on its first victory over A. This victory might be treated as
permanent in order to give parties some incentive to litigate their case to
the best of their abilities, if only to provide some information to other
parties about the current state of the law. If the case meant nothing, the
parties would not invest in its litigation and it would, in turn, provide
little in the way of useful signals to others. On the other hand, first movers like A are disadvantaged and discouraged by a rule that constrains no
one but the first mover in the event of an unsuccessful suit, but then
allows everyone else to free-ride should the first mover succeed.
One can barely imagine a rule so driven by the value of useful anticipation as to undo even a victory by A, even though such a rule would
require the regular extraction of recoveries from past winners. This sort

29. Anticipation-oriented approaches have a good deal to say about the details of
statutes of limitations and related common law doctrines, which now play the interesting
role of allocating encouragement to new winners and losers. A rule that begins the
statutory period from the moment plaintiff could or did learn about defendant's behavior
might or might not be extended to plaintiff's knowledge of new law or scientific evidence.
30. Of course, the secret to B's success might simply be turnover in the judiciary, but
no theory can hope to distinguish such causes perfectly.
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of perpetually open-ended system is especially hard to imagine in a world
31
with appeals and conflicts among courts.
It is thus possible to describe existing law, at least with respect to
change brought about through litigation, as already reflecting the value
of anticipation. A is encouraged to bring claims, and to design them
carefully, by rules allowing for some retroactive liability attached to X.
Statutes of limitations and other evidentiary or procedural rules limit A's
recovery, and while these rules diminish X's incentive to anticipate, they
also encourage A to bring better and earlier claims. 32
In contrast, once the dispute between A and X is (however temporarily) resolved, the strategy of aggressive change emphasizes the need to
think about B's and Ys incentives for anticipation, as well as whether A
and X should think more about the likelihood that new information will
lead to a rethinking of the resolution of their original dispute. Everyjudicial decision is a mere bit of information along the way; every judgment is
temporary, although some are much less likely to be undone than
others.3 3 Once this anticipation-oriented strategy is applied not only to
conventional defendants but also to plaintiffs, there is so much up for
grabs that it is difficult to identify the strategy's normative implicationsbut there is also room to imagine that prevailing rules are consistent with
the anticipation-oriented approach. This approach might, for instance,
displace the conventional language used to explain finality ofjudgments
and rules of preclusion. Claims about fairness for those who have not
had their day in court (or not been well represented by similarly situated
parties before them), along with arguments about certainty, might usefully give way to reasoning about anticipation and facilitation by all
concerned.

31. I do not mean to ridicule the strategy of aggressive change by suggesting that
there is no stopping point to its logic and no reason to regard any legal decision as
meaningful in a world that applies new law aggressively. Our inability to elicit the optimal
amount of anticipation by the various parties involved in the process of legal change does
not mean that we should completely ignore the value of elevating anticipation and
deprecating reliance. X should, after all, be encouraged to anticipate new and presumably
improved law whether it comes through legislation or litigation. At the same time,
however well X or Y is positioned to anticipate new law, there is often a need for a private
party, such as A or B, to bring claims (in court) or to exert political pressure (on the
legislature or administrative apparatus) in order to bring about new law. The more the
strategy of aggressive change focuses on X's and Y's behavior, the less it leaves law with
which to encourage A and B. Still, one committed to an anticipation-oriented approach
might argue that the public-good quality of litigation can be supplanted by the constant
incentive to anticipate law, even if actual litigation is never necessary.
32. Secondary rules and contractual arrangements deal with the incentive problems
between A and A's attorneys.
33. The differences may track familiar lines, such as that between constitutional and
other law, but discussion of the inclination ofjudges to abide by precedents is beyond the
scope of this Article.
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Recent tobacco litigation offers something of an example of this shift
in perspective.3 4 The conventional wisdom emphasizes the advantages
and disadvantages of asymmetrical preclusion of a sort, such that tobacco
companies found themselves threatened by lawsuits even after winning a
string of such suits over many years.3 5 New plaintiffs could relitigate, and
the conventional emphasis on reliance suggested that this was less unfair
the more new information developed and, especially perhaps, the more
defendants could be shown to have withheld information.3 6 If they withheld information, then their reliance was unreasonable in the extreme; if
it was simply a matter of new information, then reliance on old science
was unreasonable and unwise. An anticipation-oriented approach emphasizes, instead, the likelihood that tobacco companies had an informational advantage (regarding scientific and even political changes), and
that their anticipation of legal change is therefore to be encouraged. If
early litigation were indeed final, at least as to liability for past injuries,
then incentives for such anticipation would be greatly reduced.
Once again, changes in the legislative climate are not unlike changes
in litigation results. In the case of tobacco, legislatures can of course enact taxes, advertising restrictions, and a variety of other means to undo
subsidies and policies of the past. In the long run, such aggressive
change encourages anticipation-but mostly on one side. Plaintiffs' attorneys are obviously rewarded for developing strategies that eventually
succeed in court or in legislatures, but there is no apparent "penalty" for
failing to facilitate legal change earlier. On the other hand, plaintiffs are
penalized to the extent that they bear opportunity costs. The history of
tobacco litigation and its politics can be understood as one in which
plaintiffs bring repeated and various claims until political (or legal) success strikes. Plaintiffs' attorneys have incentives to facilitate change successfully because those who fail cannot count on being included when
victory and rewards finally arrive.
It goes almost without saying that this anticipation-oriented view of
litigation and legislation is in serious tension with the old (and often debunked) saw about legislatures looking forward and courts looking back34. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992); Roysdon v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1988); Rogers v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
557 N.E.2d 1045 (Ind.Ct. App. 1990); American Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420
(Tex. 1997); Daniel Givelber, Cigarette Law, 73 Ind. L.J. 867 (1998); Saundra Tonfy,
Cigarette Firms Lose Huge Suit: Sick Smokers Wm Fla. Class Action, Wash. Post, July 8,
1999, at A1.
35. See Rogers, 557 N.E.2d at 1054; Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d
1239, 1254 (NJ. 1990).
36. See Gilboy v. American Tobacco Co., 582 So. 2d 1263, 1265 (La. 1991); Grinnell,
951 S.W.2d at 431; Karen E. Meade, Comment, Breaking Through the Tobacco Industry's
Smoke Screen: State Lawsuits for Reimbursement of Medical Expenses, 17J. Legal Med.
113, 132-34, 138-39 (1996) (arguing that efforts by the tobacco industry to withhold
evidence of the addictive potential of nicotine support conspiracy and concert-of-action
theories, and may overcome the presumption that additional studies by the tobacco
industry would not have influenced smokers to stop smoking).
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ward. 37 The argument for encouraging useful anticipation does not depend on whether new law comes about through legislatures or courts.
There may be important reasons to prefer courts or legislatures for some
matters, but both are vehicles of change capable of encouraging useful
anticipation. There is no reason to expect the division of responsibility
between legislature and court to track the dividing line between instances
where aggressive change is and is not appropriate. Moreover, if courts
and legislatures are often substitutes and there is some reason to prefer
one or the other venue for various regulatory matters, then comparable
rules avoid creating incentives for players inefficiently to prefer one to
the other.3 8
The litigation-legislation comparison might also be put in terms of
expectations about the adversarial nature of the two systems. The anticipation-oriented approach developed here emphasizes the bilateral nature of change accomplished through litigation. The explicit adversarial
nature of litigation encourages the search for dual incentives for anticipation and facilitation. Legislative change is often more multidimensional.
Earlier anticipation-oriented work may have ignored the role of new winners because it focused on legislation rather than litigation, and because
legislation is not conventionally conceived of as the product of opposing
forces. But the more we think of interest groups battling for legislation,
the more appropriate it is to think of incentives for both new losers and
winners.3 9
In the end, I think it unlikely that the case for aggressive change is
systematically stronger or weaker depending on whether a change comes
37. See Einer R- Elhauge, Does Interest Group TheoryJustify More Intrusive Judicial
Review?, 101 Yale L.J. 31 (1991) (comparing interest group problems found in litigation
and judicial intervention with those found in legislative decisionmaking); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 Yale L.J.
331 (1991) (examining the interaction of legislature and judiciary in the legislative
process); Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110
Harv. L. Rev. 1055, 1059-66 (1997) (reviewing Supreme Court decisions on adjudicative
and legislative retroactivity).
38. This observation refers obliquely to some of the literature on takings law. See
Saul Levinore, Takings, Torts, and Special Interests, 77 Va. L. Rev. 1333, 1342 (1991)
[hereinafter Levmore, Takings, Torts, and Special Interests] (advancing theory of takings
cases that encourages neutrality between public and private sector).
I do not make too much of this argument about allocation between these branches
because for most disputes our legislatures can effectively overrule courts, and undo the
courts' transition rules as well. Therefore, in order to say something definitive about
transition rules in legislation versus litigation, we need first some predictive or normative
theory as to the allocation of decisionmaking between courts and legislatures. In the
absence of such a theory, there is probably not much to be gained by a further comparison
of anticipation incentives in the two arenas; a complete theory of the allocation of
decisionmaking is well beyond the scope of this Article.
39. It bears mentioning that transition losses cannot be made to disappear. The law
creates these burdens and can also allocate them. Note also that the reliance-oriented
approach to legal change, like the first wave of anticipation-oriented scholarship, reflects a
unilateral view of legal rulemaking.
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about through courts or legislatures. Indeed, there is a case to be made
for some diversification, with courts reviewing legislation and regulation
and deciding how aggressively to apply change based on their confidence
is
in the wisdom of the change, the extent to which early anticipation 40
desirable, and their assessment of unhealthy interest group influences.
D. EncouragingGovernments
1. New Winners, New Losers, and Governments. - Once the strategy of
aggressive change encompasses dual anticipation, encouraging new winners as well as new losers, there arises the further question of encouraging governments and regulatory authorities. A conventional law-and-economics analysis suggests that governments be encouraged to think about
the costs they impose by internalizing these costs with rules requiring payments to new losers. 4 1 A public choice version of this analysis is that the
prospect of new taxes, which will be required in order to pay for the new
burdens the government imposes, will arouse political opposition on the
part of those who expect to be taxed-and with able groups on all sides,
good political decisions are more likely to emerge. In contrast, a strategy
driven by the value of anticipation might suggest that governments pay
new winners but not new losers. New losers need to be encouraged to
anticipate government lawmaking and, at least where these new losers
might have anticipated change, compensating them might be counterproductive. But government will be less inclined to delay desirable legal
change if it must pay new winners some of the damages they suffered
because the new law was not yet in force. To the extent that political
feedback is insufficient to encourage optimal anticipation by the government itself, the strategy of aggressive change suggests that the governof these payments does
ment pay new winners-so long as the prospect
42
not itself discourage good legal change.
The argument is strongest where there is reason to think that a dispersed majority will eventually compel the government to change law for
the better. Imagine, for example, that despite intense lobbying by organ40. This last feature animates the anticipation-oriented work done by Fischel and
Sykes on the law of government (breaches of) contracts. See Daniel R. Fischel & Alan 0.
Sykes, Government Liability for Breach of Contract, 1 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. (forthcoming
Dec. 1999) (suggesting that courts can review original bargains and regulatory schemes
and decide cases of government breach accordingly). There are, of course, benefits and
costs to case-by-case judgments.

41. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 4, at 129-31; Kaplow, supra note 2, at 567.
42. The introduction of an additional actor in need of influence raises the sometimes
subtle issue of whether to use negative or positive inducements. In this context, "sticks" are

often thought inappropriate because government agents do not normally enjoy
corresponding benefits when they do well. There are modest attempts to offer prizes to
innovative government employees, although there is the danger of encouraging volatility
(because it is difficult to make them pay for corresponding errors). In any event, the
strategy of aggressive change, and the particular rules explored here, concentrate on
"sticks." In some settings, "carrots" may indeed be appropriate.
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ized industries, the government, compelled by an informed citizenry,
bans the use of some pesticides. Aggressive change applied against the
pesticide makers and users is by now familiar. Some degree of retroactive
liability might have encouraged efficient anticipation and discouraged
wasteful and dangerous political activity aimed at diluting change. Similarly, there may be good reason not to compensate new winners, which is
to say ex-losers such as consumers or farmers, who incurred losses because of the once-legal pesticide. These parties may now be new winners,
but they might well have facilitated an earlier ban if encouraged by transition rules reflecting the strategy of aggressive change.
New winners are in this way also a target of the anticipation-oriented
approach. And there is no reason to leave out a third target: The government might also have been slow to see the need for regulation or slow to
design and pass new rules. 43 A three-way division that includes the government might cause the government, or other interest groups that can
influence it, to anticipate the legal rules that will be in place once a wellinformed electorate is aware of the best scientific evidence. 44
Taken to an extreme, the anticipation-oriented approach in this way
suggests govemment liability for things ranging from new food and drug
regulation to judicial decisions reversed on appeal, overruled by statute,
or otherwise altered by future decisionmakers. After all, if legislators and
regulators can be encouraged with liability rules to anticipate better law,
then why not judges themselves? Most legislation and litigation might
generate payments not to compensate those who are newly burdened (for
they should have anticipated change), but rather to compensate those
who are now vindicated, in a sense, and who should have been declared
winners in an earlier session or court case-unless such payments will in
turn discourage their own work in advancing the cause of good law. And
where governmental liability is a good idea but for the fact that it interferes with the scheme for encouraging new winners, there is the possibility of liability that is paid into some fund that does not redound to the
benefit of any of the parties that might have facilitated change.
43. I leave aside the question of allocating responsibility among different units or
levels of government. Governments might sometimes qualify as new winners who fall into
the second group, entitled now to collect for such things as health care and cleanup costs
they once incurred. It is as an imperfect regulator that the government might be liable
under the third prong of the anticipation-oriented scheme discussed here.
44. This sort of description suggests an optimistic version of interest group behavior
that is sometimes thought of as dangerously anti-competitive. A firm that anticipates safety
developments and chooses not to use an input then prefers for its competitors to do the
same (in order not to leave them with a cost advantage). The innovator cannot simply
bank on its low-cost, less-safe competitors' losing ground because of liability, because this
liability need not change these competitors' prices in the future. An innovative firm might
therefore encourage a regulatory ban in order to force its competitors to face costs similar
to its own. The dark side of this story is that the "innovator" seeks to exploit a cost
advantage it enjoys, or hopes to encourage conformity in production and then in pricing.
There is no reason to think that these problems depend on whether the law follows an
anticipation-oriented approach.
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There is, no doubt, some limit to logical extensions of provocative
insights, and this may be a good point at which to make more manageable claims for the anticipation-oriented strategy. As a positive matter we
do not require payments from governments whenever they might have
changed laws more rapidly. And the normative argument for rampant
liability is unlikely to attract many adherents. Pockets of governmental
liability do of course exist; some might be traced to an insurance function
(as in the cases of payments for wrongful arrest or some police misbehavior) and some might be associated with categories where anticipation by
private parties seems vastly inferior to anticipation by the government. 45
There are, I think, at least two kinds of reasons for limiting the strategy of aggressive change when it comes to government's role. One is
pragmatic and the other is speculative; one has more to do with judicial
interventions and the other with legislatively sponsored change. The
pragmatic explanation for declining to encourage better-or a better
pace of-judging and regulation through liability payments by judges
and regulators to new winners is that it may help to have an arbiter
outside the system, not itself subject to the rules of aggressive change. If
judges, for instance, were required to make payments when they were
reversed on appeal, lower court judges might be biased in their decisions
(because exposure may not be symmetrical), and appeals court judges
might be chilled from reversing their colleagues below. 4 6 We might well

expect inferior rather than superior legal change in terms of both content and pace. Moreover, if a judge breaks with longstanding precedent
and is upheld on appeal, where should liability lie?
And what of courts that decline to decide certain matters and judges
who dissent? Many of these problems have counterparts where there are
private parties who are encouraged to anticipate legal change, so I hesitate to pronounce these problems intractable. Perhaps the safest thing to
say is that where private parties are concerned, the strategy of aggressive
change simply suggests that we modify the rules of liability already in
existence, and in some cases justify or explain those rules, by adding to
our earlier conceptions of liability the idea that parties be encouraged to
anticipate legal change. In the case of governments, and certainly judges,
the system has already decided to regard most of their decisions as immune from liability claims, and an anticipation-oriented approach does
not necessarily change that calculation.
45. A distinction emphasized presently infra Part I.D.2 (contrasting most regulatory
takings with physical takings).
46. There is also the more obvious chilling problem of judges' avoiding their
responsibilities or of talented persons declining to become judges because of the threat of
liability. Judges whose compensation is protected by constitutional rule might also object
that liability of the sort fantasized here defeats their job security. But these problems and
others are not insurmountable. Base pay might rise in order to encourage judges.
Innovative, prescient judges might receive bonuses. Judges might also be publicly
indemnified or privately insured, in which case the behavioral effects of the liability rule
would be even more difficult to predict.
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Concerns over strategic behavior offer additional reasons to hesitate
to encourage government officials to anticipate change. If nothing is final and the rules of aggressive change apply, then it is possible that interest groups and other investors will not devote resources to influencing
decisionmakers because there is no point in acquiring something that
can be undone at a later date. If, on the other hand, this logic fails of its
own paradoxical weight,4 7 then it is possible that rules of aggressive
change will generate more rent-seeking behavior because there is so
much at stake. Alternatively, the fact that there is more at stake might
make interest groups less potent because the salience of the large decision may bring out the best in democratic (orjudicial) decisionmaking. 48
If a government must also pay for its own failure to anticipate (its
own) decisionmaking, then there will normally be more at stake in any
given decision. Not only might an industry lose if the government bans
its product, but there will also be payments by the government to new
winners. Potential new winners may work harder because there is more
at stake. On the other hand, there is again the possibility that interest
groups (including new winners) will perceive that there is really very little
at stake, because they can always change the rules in the future and then
recover for the intermediate decision, which will then be treated as a failure to anticipate. There is no clear answer to these puzzles, and I certainly do not intend to settle on one here. But I think it plausible that
our legal system tends not to try to encourage anticipation by govemment actors because of a fear that putting more at stake (and often in
asymmetric fashion) will exacerbate interest-group problems.
Note that I do not advance a third view, that governments are assumed to be in no need of encouragement to anticipate the future. Such
a view might seem mandated by the very premise of a strategy of aggressive change, that new law is (on average) presumed to be better law so
that its anticipation is usefully encouraged. A perfectly benign government, or set of agents, facing no ambiguities about what is good for its
47. Because if no one wil ever invest, then it does pay to invest and get one's way, for
no one will invest in undoing it-and so forth.
48. Under conventional rules, if the government bans a pesticide then there is limited
or no liability for past injuries and some private loss because of reliance on the old law.
The ban imposes X costs on an industry and some consumers and it confers, we might
imagine, 2X benefits on other consumers, citizens, and perhaps some other industries who
profit from the first industry's setback. But ifvery aggressive rules of change apply, then we
might imagine that there is a cost of 2X to the industry and perhaps overall benefits of 3X.
In which of these situations will organized interest groups wield more power and engage in
more wasteful rent-seeking? On the one hand, they might compete away all the gains and
losses at stake, so that we should prefer rules that put less rather than more at stake. On
the other hand, when there is more at stake, otherwise dispersed interests may finally
organize either on their own or through political entrepreneurs. Thus, interest groups wil
introduce less bias and deadweight loss (relative to the size of the decision) when a country
is deciding whether to engage in a major war than when it is deciding on a crop subsidy.
Perhaps the simplest form of this argument is that when there is a great deal at stake,
attention is drawn to the matter and inefficient rent-seeking is less likely.
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people and interested in satisfying them or gaining their approval, would
not need to compensate for the losses it imposed either because of past
errors or because of changes in regulatory or other law. But the presumption that new law is usefully anticipated is not based on faith in the
motives of government agents. New law may be good law because, despite the best efforts of selfish agents and overachieving interest groups,
good bargains or democratic politics often yield good results. Alternatively, good law may often yield good results and eventually win out because of bargains and votes in favor of wealth-increasing and majorityenhancing pressures. This is the optimistic view of interest groups; organized groups may succeed in bringing evidence of intensity of prefer49
ences to political decisionmaking.
To be sure, it is possible that good law wins out but that before it
does, government agents systematically misanticipate legal change or
even work to delay new, improved law. It is also possible that with better
incentives these agents would facilitate better law. But my aim here is not
to insist that our rules best facilitate good legal change. I do, however,
claim that it is useful to extend the anticipation-oriented approach to include new winners and sometimes even governments-and that the rules
we experience can be described as doing just that. I make no claim as to
whether we have the best possible rules.
2. Aggressive Change and the Law of Takings. - I have suggested that
our legal system encourages anticipation by new winners and new losers,
but that it often declines to use available incentives to encourage anticipation by governments themselves. It would be a mistake, however, to write
off the anticipation-oriented approach as having no application to government agents. The most exciting application is in the area of government interventions litigated under the Fifth Amendment, where there is
the potential for nothing less than a revolutionary theory of takings law.
Consider the familiar contrast between regulatory interventions, which
are generally uncompensated, and physical takings of private property by
the government, which usually trigger the just compensation requirement of the Fifth Amendment.50 If the government regulates a factory so
that its value is reduced, there is generally no compensation even if the
reduction in value is fairly severe; but if the government takes a piece of
the factory or even appropriates some output of that factory, compensation is required. An anticipation-oriented perspective offers an elegant
theory regarding this distinction. And it is a theory with both positive and
normative features.
A fair amount of regulation might be usefully anticipated. If a factory owner knew that a production method would be deemed unsafe or
49. See Saul Levmore, Voting Paradoxes and Interest Groups, 28 J. Legal Stud. 259,
259 (1999) [hereinafter Levmore, Voting Paradoxes].
50. See generally Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings:
An Economic Analysis, 72 Cal. L. Rev. 569 (1984); Levmore, Takings, Torts, and Special
Interests, supra note 38.
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that inputs would be banned-and that such interventions will be uncom-

pensable-then the factory owner would often choose a different method
of production in order to avoid unnecessary losses. But if the government pays for losses suffered as a result of regulation, then the factory
owner has no incentive to anticipate these regulations and to facilitate
the move to better and safer methods. In contrast, while an individual
factory owner might well have an informational advantage about safe production methods, for example, it is unlikely that a given property owner
has a comparable advantage with respect to where the government is
likely to build a road or where the government is likely to turn for its
inputs. In the latter case, in any event, we would normally not want a
property owner to anticipate uncompensated takings-because then the
owner would choose not to produce (or perhaps would choose to conceal) things that the government needed. And in the prototypical case of
taking land to build a road, even if people can anticipate new roadbuilding, perhaps because they observe increased population density, there is
no reason to think that private parties have an informational advantage
over the government as to where such roads will run. Moreover, no single individual is likely to affect the need for roads enough to make us
wish that anticipation would translate into a different location decision.
The same analysis holds where the government takes a firm's output in
wartime. Anticipation by the firm is difficult and rarely useful, and where
anticipation is possible, we would like the firm to expect compensation
rather than to shift away from goods needed by the government.
As with so many theories of takings, the theory is an imperfect tool
for prediction. There are, after all, regulations and other government
activities that generate losses that go uncompensated under our legal
rules (as well as those of all other jurisdictions), but where new losers are
unlikely to have an informational advantage that might have been exploited in the interest of efficient facilitation. If, for example, the government builds or expands an airport in a way that reduces nearby property
values because of increased noise, compensation is unusual. But it is
hard to see how property owners might have facilitated change, and difficult, therefore, to see how noncompensation might encourage useful anticipation. If the rule were one of partial recovery, then we might say that
property owners were meant to anticipate change at least insofar as they
should not improve their properties (so as to reduce the loss imposed by
airport expansion). But the rule normally offers no compensation, and,
in any event, the government is likely to be the better facilitator or cost
avoider.5 1
There are also cases where the law provides for compensation but
where payments probably interfere with efficient facilitation. A property
owner who does not want a road to be built through her property might
51. I leave for another day the interesting question of why partial recoveries are here
(and elsewhere) unusual.
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rush to improve land in the hope that the government will be discouraged from taking it and will instead take other land and even bestow a
windfall on the improver. In such a case, the anticipation-oriented approach (not to mention common sense) suggests the advantage of a rule
permitting an uncompensated taking.
These flaws in the descriptive power of a theory of takings law based
on the idea of encouraging useful anticipations do not, of course, destroy
the suggested theory. A more perfect and precise rule system might be
expensive to administer. To be sure, the theory advanced here would be
quite stunning if compensation were awarded where regulatory intervention was relatively hard to anticipate, and if it were not awarded where
physical takings could have been anticipated and facilitated by property
owners. But we are accustomed to overinclusive rules, and I think the
link between anticipation (and informational advantages) and regulation-as opposed to most physical takings-quite remarkable. There are
more details to be explained, but a full re-examination of takings law
through the lens of the anticipation-oriented approach requires a separate effort.
3. From Property to Other Rights. - The strategy of aggressive change
applies to the government in contexts other than takings law. Consider,
for example, a criminal procedure case where a court undoes earlier
precedents or reinterprets the Constitution to the benefit of a criminal
defendant by finding that a practice followed by the police is unacceptable. In some of these cases courts feel compelled, having now "found
the law," to apply it retroactively. This inclination may have something to
do with the need to reward litigants (in which case the earlier discussion
about influencing both winners and losers is relevant) and the perceived
need to be consistent across like cases.5 2 In other cases, courts may find a
way to impose new constraints on police without benefitting past defendants. The anticipation-oriented approach-if applied to governmentsuggests that this balance, if it can be called that, should be shifted further in favor of retroactive application in order to encourage desirable
anticipatory behavior on the part of the police and prosecutors. This is
because the government can sometimes be enlisted to anticipate in a useful manner, while it is unlikely that criminal defendants have comparable
informational (and behavioral) advantages. If the government suspects
that a court decision might be applied aggressively, so as to free persons
already incarcerated (or even simply to require new trials), then law enforcement officials might well be encouraged to anticipate future court
decisions, even if this means offering advantages to those they investigate
and arrest. Here, there is not much that an arrested person could have
done, and perhaps very little possibility that most potential defendants
will know anything about legal trends; but there is a great deal that the
52. See Krent, supra note 1, at 2167 (suggesting that retroactivity in criminal law is
especially suspect because the new losers are especially powerless).
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government might have done by anticipating new rules of criminal
procedure.
An obvious reaction is that the government is not really in a better
position to anticipate change. A manufacturer might know a good deal
about chemicals it uses, but the police have no special information about
the "Constitution's" attitude toward searches. Of course, the more one
thinks of constitutional questions as involving neither absolute rights nor
the politics of those who happen to be appointed to the Court, but rather
cost-benefit calculations, the more the government does indeed resemble
a manufacturer. For example, police might well develop better information about the costs and benefits of anti-loitering statutes or stop-andsearch strategies, anticipating the possibility that the courts will declare
new and "better" law on these matters.53 Retroactive liability for governmental new losers-in this case the police-would encourage such
anticipation.
There is of course the danger of excessive precautions, which is to
say costly misanticipations. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that
government agents are unlikely to be penalized as much for overanticipating on behalf of criminal defendants as for underanticipating, because it is harder for victims to gain standing and to show measurable
damages. But the more one is optimistic about legal change the less one
is troubled by these costs. Comparable dangers apply where private parties are concerned, although they internalize costs and benefits rather
differently from public agents who may enjoy greater informational ad54
vantages than their private counterparts.
In sum, it is easier to extend the logic of the anticipation-oriented
approach to new winners than it is to government decisionmakers, and
the inclusion of new winners-but not government decisionmakers-succeeds in placing much of prevailing law in a favorable light. In some
contexts, there is little likelihood of useful anticipation by the government and grave danger of discouraging desirable change by holding governments accountable in the way that private parties might be. In a world
of overinclusive rules, there is surely something to be said for a presumption of retroactivity in tort law, to take one example, but not in public law.
But in other settings, the extension to anticipation by governments seems
sensible. I have suggested that it might form a new basis for understanding takings law as well.

53. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1853 (1999) (striking down
Chicago's anti-gang loitering ordinance as too vague); Harper v. Virginia Dep't of
Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 95 (1993); James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529,
537 (1991); Welch v. Cadre Capital, 946 F.2d 185, 186 (2d Cir. 1991).
54. There are agency problems in the private sector as well, but it appears to be much
easier to have private agents share in the gains they generate. It is therefore easier, and
less distorting, to ask them to share in the costs.
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E. Interest Groups and Government Compensation Once More
I have already emphasized that while aggressive change might encourage socially useful anticipation of legal changes, it might also encourage wasteful investments that aim to prevent or slow change, especially if the compensation rules are imperfect. On the other hand,
proponents of good change might offer to compensate new losers in order to facilitate legal change. It is noteworthy that this line of reasoning
becomes faint in most public-law contexts. Prosecutors might, for instance, over-litigate in opposition to change because they do not want to
free those already incarcerated-but it is difficult to compensate prosecuneither
tors and their principals when they are new "losers," and 5when
5
the new winners nor new losers are particularly organized.
A related but fairly distinct approach focuses on the role of interest
groups. Overachieving, well-organized interest groups might benefit
from their ability to "acquire" regulations that benefit them at the expense of efficiency or of the majority, even though they recognize that
these benefits are short-term. Thus, an interest group might obtain
"safety" regulations that serve to promote ill health or to keep out new
competitors, although over time a strong, informed majority develops
against these policies. Against this backdrop, there is again a fairly good
argument for (some) compensation for new winners. Once good law
prevails, we might go back and pay those who suffered from the bad laws
and, in turn, the system might then be less inclined to do the bidding of
selfish and inefficient interests in the first place. Put differently, a focus
on optimal timing may improve content. The argument is thus a version
of the conventional law-and-economics case for compensable regulatory
takings: A government that one day must pay for what it does might be
much less inclined to regulate inefficiently. Overachieving interest
groups will get their way56less often if the policies they propose are seen to
require explicit outlays.
The interest group perspective raises the question of how to design
transition rules so as to minimize the deadweight loss attributable to rentseeking. Some of the effort expended in attempting to influence the
political process is likely to inform legislators and the public, but it seems
55. Much the same conclusion can be drawn from a perspective that focuses on the
medium, or decisionmaker, rather than on the winners and losers. Since most change in
private law originates with, or can be reviewed by, the legislature, legislatures can ease
change by choosing to compensate new losers. However, the courts entrusted with
constitutional change lack comparable ability to compensate. The biggest difference
between the private and public contexts, however, returns us to thinking about potential
losers and their constituents. The social costs associated with potential losers' attempts to
stall change are surely much greater in the private sphere than in most of public law. Overlitigating seems a less serious cost than most other rent-seeking. Although it is hard to take
account of all of these costs, the anticipation-oriented approach still has some value. Yet,
once we agree to take anticipation seriously, there is no reason to ignore the roles of new
winners and governments.
56. Put this way, the argument neglects the difficulty of internalizing benefits.
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safe to abide by the conventional wisdom that the power of politics to
create and redistribute wealth generates efforts to capture this power that
in turn may be inefficient because they are duplicative (which is to say
part of a zero-sum game) or corrupt (aimed at exacerbating principalagent problems).57 As a first cut, it seems that an anticipation-oriented
approach might encourage more rent-seeking because each proposed
change would involve greater stakes. 58 One might, therefore, argue
against aggressive change on grounds that even if most new law is good
law, there will be more deadweight loss associated with each instance of
new law, and perhaps a larger fraction of new law will be bad law because
of the impact of rent-seeking endeavors.
The flaw in this argument is that aggressive change does not necessarily raise the stakes (and therefore the rent-seeking) associated with
new law because the practice of aggressive change will also be anticipated
for future changes. Rules enacted today are then weaker because they
may be undone by future changes which will again bring on compensation for new losers. Today's winners can be tomorrow's losers. Today's
rent-seekers have a great deal to gain or lose in nominal terms because
today's results, applied aggressively, bring on compensation claims regarding the past. Still, those who face these liabilities can sit on the sidelines and then undo all that transpires by investing in the next round of
politics.
The argument also applies when the government compensates new
winners for their past losses. If new winners can (in the absence of
changed circumstances) point to new law and bring claims for the failure
of lawmakers to facilitate or anticipate new law, then new law will be associated with governmental payments for delay in its passage. In turn,
agents and interest groups might find new law too costly and might work
to block rather than to anticipate it. The argument is surely stronger if
there are errors in determining when there are changed circumstances,
and thus no reason to impose liability for a failure to anticipate new law.
But even where there is no error of this kind, once there is any delay in
passing good law, then the requirement that new winners be compensated can discourage rather than encourage quicker passage of good law.
If there is a kink in this argument it is that lawmakers must worry that
their opposition to change will eventually fail and that all they will have
done is to delay new law. If delay is to remain a fruitful strategy, it is
because as the magnitude of projected payments triggered by change increases, the likelihood of change probably diminishes. It seems possible,
therefore, to encourage better lawmaking by associating change with payments for delay. The argument can be understood as borrowing from
57. See Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 Va. L. Rev. 339, 343
(1988).
58. Assuming, for the sake of avoiding repetition, that greater stakes generate more
political activity. See supra note 48.
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the libertarian, or "property rights," approach to takings law, but then
following its logic somewhat further and turning it on its head.
While some would have government pay new losers, arguing that interest groups will do less damage if the government must pay for the costs
it imposes, by the same logic the government should pay for the burdens
it imposes by delaying good law. Past losers should be compensated just
as new losers are. Imagine for example that an environmental group succeeds in blocking a developer's plan to extend the footprint of a building. The familiar argument is that the government should pay the developer at least the amount of the fall in value of this property. But if the
environmental group in fact gets its way (with or without court-ordered
compensation for the developer), why not take the occasion to imply a
change in baselines such that the government should now pay the environmental group for any losses imposed by the developer's earlier
construction?
A very different perspective on these questions begins with sovereign
immunity and those areas in which governments do not traditionally pay
for harms they generate. Rather than looking to ancient times for some
baseline, we might simply begin in the present with the observation that
although the government is required to pay for some takings, and
although it agrees to pay for a variety of torts and contract breaches, it
does not pay for those that can be traced to its "discretionary function."5 9
There are a number of explanations for these rules and distinctions,
ranging from historical to structural (i.e., separation of powers) to allocative. 60 The allocative notion is that the more governmental actions are
substitutes for private activity, the more governmental liability succeeds in
encouraging a healthy (undistorted) allocation between the private and
public sectors. But this theory says something only about those cases
where there is the possibility of moving activities from the private to the
public sector or back again. It says nothing about those cases where the
likelihood of substitution is very low. It is not as if the ability of the government to make war free of ex post negligence suits is what encourages
war to be made through the public rather than the private sector. On the
other hand, we need some other theory as to why there is no liability for
negligently declared or managed wars. Again, there are a number of explanations available. For present purposes we might simply say that there
are ample political checks on such important or "discretionary" acts of
government.
In the case of "negligent" lawmaking there is again no ready substitution between the private and public sectors. Lawmaking is in this sense
(and others as well) the quintessential discretionary function of government. This is so whether we view lawmaking idealistically, as an effort to
59. See Levmore, Takings, Torts, and Special Interests, supra note 38, at 1350-52.
60. See Krent, supra note 1, at 2152-67.
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advance the public good, or cynically, as the product of competition
among private firms and interest groups.
There is, I think, an important difference between anticipation in
the public and private sectors. It is a difference that returns us to the idea
that the majority can choose to compensate. Imagine, for instance, that a

new majority passes a new law, presumed here to be a good law but also
one that benefits the majority. The same majority, if it is secure, could
pass the law and simultaneously compensate itself for losses suffered as a
result of the fact that this new law was not passed earlier. Thus, if the
majority passes a rule banning the sale of tobacco to minors, it could also
pass a rule taxing manufacturers or growers or retailers for the harm imposed by past sales to minors. 61 The majority might choose to use these
new revenues to pay the health costs associated with teenage smoking.
Similarly, almost any new law can be accompanied by a legislative plan
that provides compensation for new winners. Presumably, new law is
often unaccompanied by such compensatory legislation because the coalition that supports the new law would not support more aggressive
change of this sort. Perhaps compensation would motivate new losers to
organize more vigorously to block change. In short, new winners sometimes offer to compensate new losers in order to facilitate the adoption of
the new law, but new winners can also elect to hold the new losers liable
for old losses suffered by the new winners. New winners would not gain
much from a legal rule mandating these payments, and there are of
course many times when they would lose because the all-or-nothing character of legal change would make change itself less likely.
If we imagine a world in which flexibility is somehow not permitted,
so that all changes must either be accompanied by compensation for new
winners or, at the opposite extreme, all changes must be as prospective as
possible, then reasonable people might disagree as to which rule was
more likely to promote good law. The former rule mightily promotes
anticipation, but it is also likely to encourage political opposition to
change. If such opposition is often successful, an aggressive rule may
generate less rather than more good law. It is not surprising that ours is a
more flexible world, where aggressive change is neither forbidden nor
mandatory. Good law is sometimes encouraged by unaggressive change.
Modest retroactivity (as promoted by statutes of limitations and the like)
might promote some anticipation by new losers but non-excessive political opposition.
My intuition is that, on the margin, change is and should be more
aggressively imposed when it comes at the hands of judges rather than
legislators. Court cases, like legislation, are products of investments by
61. The charge might be an exact one. Thus, tax rates could rise for all firms but

then credits could be offered on a sliding scale, with larger credits for firms that sold fewer
cigarettes to minors. More likely, an inexact tax would do the job; prospective taxes on
retailers or other parties in the distribution chain would fall fairly squarely on those who
sold to minors in the past.
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opposing interests; a rule of aggressive change might therefore stimulate
enough litigation by those seeking to block change as to more than offset
the gains from encouraging anticipation.6 2 Still, ifjudges are somewhat
more independent than legislators, then aggressive change is less likely to
block good change in courts than in legislatures. Indeed, this is more or
less what we find; most changes wrought by courts are accompanied by
some retrospective liability, while many more changes enacted by legislators not only spare new losers from paying the new winners but also protect new losers against their transition losses.
Retrospective validity is much less usual where the litigation is against
the government itself. In these cases we see new losers protected in the
interest of encouraging good law. Classic cases involve "structural injunctions" regarding such things as prison conditions and school desegregation. 63 In the prison case, for example, imagine that a claim is brought
that prisoners' rights are violated by the overcrowded conditions in local
jails. Where relief is granted, it is common for the legal change to be
unaggressive, awarding no damages to those who suffered from the
crowded conditions even though the law now declares these conditions to
have been wrongful. 6 4 It is almost conventional wisdom to observe that if
prospective relief (for example, in reforming prisons) needed to be accompanied by retrospective damages, change would come about less
quickly and even less frequently. Judges are more likely to grant relief,
and to impose serious costs on taxpayers for an unpopular cause, if they
need not also award monetary damages to an unpopular, politically weak
group like prisoners.
Implicit in this observation about judge-made change is the idea that
judges fear or at least identify with taxpayers and legislators. 65 Alternatively, there is the possibility thatjudges will call for aggressive change on
the government's part but that the legislature will then partly overrule
the courts through budgetary or other maneuvers. Ifjudges call for damages to be paid to prisoners who live in crowded conditions, then legislatures (even if they feel forced to produce the funds called for by courts)
might either reduce other expenditures which benefit these prisoners or
spend less on other prisons. This could force courts to micro-manage
prisons in a way beyond their competence or ambition. In short, the very
sentiment or conception of rights that causes a court to demand less
crowded prisons is likely to make the court eager to impose costs on the
non-prison population that are low rather than high. The need to build
62. For the provocative idea that interest groups may affectjudicial decisionmaking as
much as legislation, see Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More
Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 Yale L.J. 31, 80-81 (1991).
63. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 (1978); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S.
717, 741 (1974); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971).
64. See Hutto, 437 U.S. at 683-84.
65. Private firms, as losing defendants, are less often accommodated with decisions
that strive to be prospective only. On the other hand, private firms are often in battle with
other private firms.
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more prisons or free some prisoners might on its own serve as enough of
an incentive for the legislature to anticipate these judicial decisions.
II.

REPARATIONS

A. An Anticipation-OrientedApproach to Reparations
Consider finally those cases where a government voluntarily compensates very old losers. I have identified these cases as involving both regret
and accompanying payments, where the payments were not required by
courts or by earlier agreements and where they are not mere settlements
in the shadow of litigation or legislation. 66 An anticipation-oriented approach suggests that reparations or other payments to new winners are
sound as a matter of transition policy. Such payments for past wrongs
might encourage the government to change more quickly away from policies it will come to regret.67 Constituent groups that benefit from (potentially) regrettable laws will have less of an incentive to hang on to the old
ways if they see that delayed change will be more expensive than quick
change. Nor is it likely that these parties will remain passive because
change is unpredictable and might occur in any direction. Reparative
payments tend to apply to a subset of those cases where an identifiable
group received inferior treatment. Members of the majority coalition
might be unsure whether they will ever need to pay current losers, but if
they move to laws that provide equal treatment then they can be fairly
sure that no future legal regime will hold them responsible for past equality. Experience suggests that law sometimes permits unequal treatment
but often evolves in the direction of mandating equal treatment.
But the simple internalization policy sketched above is unhelpful as a
positive matter both because so many past wrongs in fact go unrepaired
(despite the possibility that a regimen which included reparations would
encourage facilitation by the government and by beneficiaries under old,
bad law) and because the same logic suggests that most regulation and
especially deregulation will generate reparative payments to old losers as
they are created. Related intuitions suggest that a normative approach
will be no more fruitful. Aggressive change is more easily applied to pri66. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. Regret and the passage of time might of
course lead courts to order payments by the government. We might think of these as
reparative, especially when the government does not strongly fight the claim. In fact,
however, recent notable payments have been legislative in origin. Moreover, unless we
revisit the idea that interest groups work through courts as they do through legislatures, a
public choice explanation of reparations might be best limited to legislated payments.
67. In interest group terms, there may be actors or groups who will work to avoid the
future tax bill associated with past wrongs. Virtually any calculation attributed to the
government can in this manner be ascribed to groups that affect what the government
does. Note, however, that it may be rational to encourage the government to change a
policy, such as one that discriminates against a group; but once this policy changes, those
who worked for change may have every incentive to delay the legislation of reparative
payments. One kind of interest group story describes the change in government policy,
while quite another explains the reparations themselves.
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vate parties than to govemments-and indeed governments may facilitate change more successfully if they are immune from the rules associated with aggressive change.
A different use of the anticipation-oriented approach is much more
interesting. Starting with the idea that good change might be impeded
by a rule requiring governments (and evenjudges) to pay for their failure
to facilitate, we should look for required compensation by the government when there is little chance that the expectation of such payments
will block change and when the potential for compensation is unlikely to
interfere with new winners' efforts to bring about change. Viewed in this
manner, the striking thing about familiar reparations, as for example
those legislated recently for once-interned Japanese Americans, 6 8 is that
payments came so long after the misdeeds and subsequent change occurred. 69 For better or worse, it is unlikely that these reparations, and
any precedents they may set, would have any influence on government
policies during a future war. It is also unlikely that they would have any
effect on potential losers seeking to avoid or bring an end to internment
or other unequal treatment. In short, if we seek to understand reparative
payments in functional terms, then we should look not to the obvious
internalization or deterrence idea that governments pay so that they will
consider the costs they impose, but rather, and to the contrary, to the fact
that such payments are sufficiently unpredictable and slow in coming that
they do not influence the likelihood of substantive change. If the payments could be expected to come quickly after a decision to end an internment policy, then such a decision might be delayed because the inclination of a government or interest group to avoid making payments
might well dominate the added incentive of the poorly treated group to
argue yet more strongly for change.
The connection between this argument and the nearly conventional
wisdom regarding such things as injunctions aimed at prison conditions is
fairly clear. Just as the very parties who most want less crowded prisons
might favor a rule that associated (or at least permitted) structural relief
with the absence of monetary payments for past crowding,7 0 some groups
that are seriously aggrieved might waive their rights to compensation in
order to end the policies they find so painful. Long after the government's policy has changed, when regret is the dominant emotion, there is
no harm in reopening the case for compensation. I will suggest presently
68. See Restitution for World War H Internment of Japanese-Americans and Aleuts,
50 U.S.C. § 1989 (1994).

69. See id. § 1989a(a); see also Marl J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical
Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 323, 363-68 (1987) (discussing
the internment ofJapanese Americans).
70. The idea is that structural relief is more likely to be obtained if judges (and
obviously legislators) can improve conditions without also requiring payments to those who
have been incarcerated. See Douglas Laycock, Injunctions and the Irreparable Injury
Rule, 57 Tex. L. Rev. 1065, 1068 (1979) (reviewing Owen M. Fiss, The Civil Rights
Injunction (1978)); supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
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that such compensation, long after the original wrongdoing, is largely a
political matter. Thus, even after fifty years' time, I would not expect
compensation for prisoners who come to be regarded as having justly
served time but as having been unjustly made to serve that time in horrible conditions. Compensation would have no real effect on the rate of
change one way or the other, so reparative payments would not interfere
with the path of change as understood through the anticipation-oriented
approach-but prisoners are simply apt to remain an unpopular cause.
If all we cared about was facilitating optimal change, we would say that
these old losers could be compensated but that there is no need to compensate them; their weak political status then explains the absence of
reparations.
Monetary reparations have of course not been paid to African Americans for slavery, subjugation, and government-sanctioned discrimination.
The theory advanced here can make some sense of this apparent paradox
or contrast with the Japanese American case. 71 Even with no new theory,
there is no shortage of modest explanations for the contrasting remedies
offered to Japanese Americans and African Americans. African American
claims may simply be too numerous and overwhelming to be granted.
The Japanese American claims were sufficiently small that no strong
72
interest group was likely to arise in opposition to these payments.

Japanese American internees were concentrated in a few western states, 73
and public choice theory suggests that a small organized minority will
often fare better than a dispersed one of equal size-or even of much
greater size. 74 It did not hurt that the President who signed the necessary
to
legislation had been the Governor of California and thus was likely
75
claimants.
the
of
some
to
sympathetic
and
with
familiar
been
have
A very different (but reasonable) reaction to the apparent puzzle of
reparative treatment is to insist that there is little difference in the
groups' treatments and, therefore, not much to explain. Affirmative action or other programs might be understood as substitutes for monetary
reparations. Alternatively, African American reparations may yet be legis71. See Boris I. Bittker, The Case for Black Reparations 8 (1973); Rhonda V. Magee,
The Master's Tools, from the Bottom Up: Responses to African American Reparations
Theory in Mainstream and Outsider Remedies Discourse, 79 Va. L. Rev. 863, 868 (1993);
Verdun, supra note 9, at 612.
72. It is tempting to add that a much bigger group might not (setting aside the history
of African Americans) have been interned at all, so that reparations end up being paid to
small groups because it is such groups that are subject to certain kinds of discrimination in
the first place.
73. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 87 (1943).
74. The classic citation is to Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (1971)
(arguing that collective action problems are greatest in large groups; such problems are
therefore likely to remain latent due to greater anonymity, lower probability that individual
effort makes a useful contribution, and greater enforcement problems).
75. See Larry Liebert, Reagan Signs War Camps Redress Bill, S.F. Chron., August 11,
1988, at Al.
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lated, in which case the present perception76 of an apparent puzzle will
come to be seen as a matter of impatience.
Public choice theory helps to explain the payment of reparations,
and all these explanations, if they can be called that, are useful in constructing a more general theory of when reparations are made. The
Japanese American case may simply be a straightforward example of political success by a discrete minority, with a number of other factors playing
supporting roles. Nevertheless, the anticipation-oriented approach supports a more interesting and perhaps better understanding. We have
seen that requiring governments to pay new winners injured by the slow
pace of change might impede desirable change. Limiting payments from
new losers to new winners is more plausible when the new loser is the
government than when new losers are private parties. Reparations are an
exception to the extent that reparative payments occur where legal
change is so dramatic and so far in the past that there is little fear that the
prospect of these payments will slow change.
If these observations are useful in understanding the absence of
African American reparations, it is because the law's reaction to its own
history with respect to that group remains uncompleted. A hint of this
can be found in the common reaction that reparative payments to
African Americans might be unwise because such payments would mark a
close to a period of introspection, apology, lawsuits, and affirmative action.7 7 It is interesting and perhaps mysterious that this might be so with
regard to reparations and not, say, affirmative action. It is rarely claimed
that affirmative action is a bad idea (or a good one) because it suggests
finality, yet monetary reparations are often associated with the idea (good
or bad, depending on the observer) of a fresh start for race relations and
the law. This association of reparations with finality may in fact reflect a
deeper inclination to avoid collective8 payments where legal and cultural
change is still very much underway?7
In the case of reparations to African Americans, it is indeed quite
plausible that payments would interfere with "good" change, or at least
changes that a majority of African Americans might favor. Affirmative
action and other programs often command narrow majorities. Indeed, a
version of minimum winning coalition theory suggests that we should expect proponents to advance programs up to the point where only a slim
76. See, e.g., Tuneen E. Chisoln, Sweep Around Your Own Front Door. Examining
the Argument for Legislative African American Reparations, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 677, 703
(1999); IrmaJacqueline Ozer, Reparations for African Americans, 41 How. L.J. 479 (1998).
77. See Magee, supra note 71, at 880-81. The concern about reparations and a sense
of finality is, of course, not limited to this setting. See Martha Minow, Between Vengeance
and Forgiveness 93, 105 (1998) (post-apartheid South Africa and Japanese offer of

privately funded reparations to "comfort women").
78. Note the implicit claim that affirmative action connotes an ongoing process while

monetary payments connote finality to the remedial process.
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majority of the legislature (or population) is supportive. 79 If new law
then required payments to new winners, it is easy to see that support
would drop and that the new settling point would reflect a much less
ambitious program. The intuition behind this claim is most straightforward when the new law at issue is legislative, as most of the proposed
payments to Japanese Americans and African Americans have been.8 0
Here the intuition is that if new law comes with liability for those who
failed to provide good law in the past, as well as with payments to those
who lost from the absence of this good law, potentially liable parties will
decline to pass the new law. A majority might well pass some programs
that are costly to its members, if only because it has deep regret, but programs can be expected sometimes, if not often, to be less ambitious than
they might have been if they must be accompanied by payments for the
past.
B. Toward a More Complete Positive Theory of Reparations
1. International Payments. -

Reparations paid across international

boundaries are like domestic reparations in name only. For one thing,
the label is often attached to involuntary international payments, since
reparations is a term of legal art and a damage remedy in international
law. 8 ' An international court or arbitrator might "require" reparative
82
payments, and winners might impose reparations on losers of wars.

Reparations are also offered by countries to citizens of other countries as
a kind of settlement after some act that might have generated a formal
international dispute. Large-scale examples in these categories include
payments by Germany to Holocaust survivors and to the State of Israel
after World War 11,83 payments by Germany to the Allied countries following World War 1,84 and payments by the United States to families of victims aboard an Iranian airliner shot down by the U.S.S. Vincennes in
1988.85 In some of these cases, the continued use of the reparative label
79. See William H. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions 40, 47-76 (1984)

(developing idea of a minimum winning coalition, a group that would lose if one member
were subtracted from it).
80. See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that redress
for slavery and discrimination is within legislative, but notjudicial, power); Commission to
Study Reparation Proposals for African Americans Act, H.R. 1684, 102d Cong. (1991).
81. See Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, Reparations, in 4 Encyclopedia of Public
International Law 178, 178 (Rudolf Berhardt ed., 1982).
82. See id. at 178-79.
83. The West German legislature passed a series of acts in the 1950s authorizing
payments to Holocaust survivors and Israel known as the Bundesentschddigungsgesetz [BEG).
See Nicholas Balabkins, West German Reparations to Israel 147-50 (1971); Bittker, supra
note 71, at 179.
84. See F.W. Taussig, Germany's Reparation Payments, Atlantic Monthly, Mar. 1920,
at 398, 398-99 (describing Germany's post-World War I payments); see also Balabkins,
supra note 83, at 24-25 (same).
85. See Settlement Agreement on the Case Concerning the Aerial Incident of 3 July
1988 before the International Court ofJustice, Feb. 9, 1996, U.S.-Iran, 35 I.L.M. 553, 572.
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requires some retreat from the earlier definition, which identified reparations as payments in the absence of legal obligation. On the other hand,
inasmuch as international law lacks an enforcement mechanism, we can
think of these international payments as voluntary even though they may
86
be associated with legally cognizable claims.
Still, if we permit some comparison of domestic and international
reparations, the anticipation-oriented approach is consistent with both
domestic reparations for bad law that was very far in the past and with
international reparations for more recent events. In the international
context, after all, neither new winners nor responsible governments have
much to do with defining what is new and good law when the law is created internationally or in another jurisdiction. If all forms of sovereign
immunity were suddenly removed for domestic cases, then we might
worry that a government would interfere with good domestic change in
order to avoid liability, but the same government has much less control
over change in international law than it does over its domestic law.
Moreover, in the international context there will rarely be an interest
group that will move to reopen the question of liability to foreigners, so
that again the norm of voluntary reparations is unlikely to threaten the
course of legal change. 87 Imagine, for example, a regrettable incident in
which the U.S. military injures U.S. citizens and then another similar incident where the losses befall foreigners. If the domestic incident leads to
a legal decision immunizing the government, the prospect of voluntary
reparations could easily have some impact on regulatory oversight, government operations, or the path of law itself. If reparations connote finality, then payment might head off future litigation or a legislative inquiry which could have brought about changes. If reparations come to
be expected, then most of the harms associated with an end to sovereign
immunity will arise.8 8 If reparations are paid rarely, then burdened parties will often organize and draw attention to the behavior that harmed
them and to the details of the immunity.
However, the distance of wrongdoers from the injured parties in the
international case makes it much harder to believe that payments will
negatively affect the course of change. Indeed, payments by a government to injured foreigners might draw attention to the source of the
claim and lead to reform in the interest of preventing future injuries and
liability. This is, of course, hardly much of a normative argument in favor
86. Since this Article defines quickly paid domestic transfers as settlements rather
than as voluntary reparations, it is unsurprising that international reparations follow
admitted wrongdoing more quickly than do domestic ones.
87. Put differently, foreign interest groups may be as likely to generate backlash as

sympathy.
88. On sovereign immunity as a tool to promote the separation of powers, see
generally HaroldJ. Krent, Reconceptualizing Sovereign Immunity, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 1529
(1992). Reparations will likely do no harm because it is not the courts that will require this
remedy.

HeinOnline -- 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1691 1999

1692

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99:1657

of the difference between domestic and international practices. And
even as a positive matter it is plausible that once we shed the labels attached to payments, voluntary domestic payments come rather frequently. On the other hand, when domestic payments come quickly after
an injury it is difficult to think of them as voluntarily made, because litigation has not run its course. In any event, the set of payments made long
after an injury will be dominated by domestic payments. When international payments are made they should look more like tort recoveries and
much less like long-sought successes by well-situated interest groups.8 9
2. Domestic Reparations.- We have already seen that domestic reparations are likely to come when a much earlier legal regime or determination comes to seem very wrong. Indeed, the regret itself needs to be longheld (and no longer in the process of change) to fit the picture drawn
here. Modest misgivings are less likely to generate sufficient political interest. This distinction is like that between modest and serious large-scale
natural disasters; the latter are far more likely to attract media coverage
and build sympathy for the claim of an organizable group of victims. 90
I have already referred to the legislation dealing with Japanese Americans who were interned during World War II. Somewhat more modest
reparations were subsequently offered to Latin Americans ofJapanese ancestry who were brought to the United States during the same wartime
period.9 ' In retrospect, the substance and procedures associated with
these deprivations of liberty and attendant takings of property seem quite
extraordinary and shameful. Once we see these payments as liberated by
the distance between the deprivations and the compensation, so that effects on change are unlikely, we realize that quicker payments might have
been politically difficult because of the resentment in some quarters at
the notion of compensating these war-time losers while others who sacrificed life and liberty for their country received little or no compensation.
Another important example that is comfortably categorized as reparative involves payments to Native American tribes beginning with the
Indian Claims Act of 1946.92 Furthermore, Canada also made payments
to its aboriginal peoples and to the Japanese Canadians it interned during World War 11. 9 3 This sort of uniformity among legal systems may sug89. Political power is unimportant because recovery is sought from a foreign entity,
except insofar as it can be used to push one's own government to pressure a foreign
payment.

90. See Saul Levmore, Coalitions and Quakes: Disaster Relief and Its Prevention, 3 U.
Chi. Roundtable 1, 1-3 (1996).
91. See U.S. Will Pay Reparations to Former Latin American Internees, N.Y. Times,
June 15, 1998, at A19 (reporting settlement of $5000 to each of 1200 Latin Americans of
Japanese descent who were forcibly brought from thirteen countries to the United States
and placed in internment camps during World War II).
92. 25 U.S.C. § 70 (1946) (repealed 1978). At the time of repeal, any remaining
claims were transferred to the United States Court of Claims. See id. at § 70v.
93. See John F. Bums, Ottawa Will Pay Compensation to Uprooted JapaneseCanadians, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1988, at A10 (reporting Canadian decision to pay the
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gest the presence of important underlying causes and thus form the basis
for a useful positive theory.
Regret regarding the treatment of Native Americans may have generated serious cultural introspection, and this regret is an important condition of reparative payments. Still, it is important to recognize that the
reparative legislation was aimed at those who suffered some specific legal,
equitable, or treaty-based injury. It accomplished little for the descendants of those who may have been victimized by brutal warfare, ongoing
discrimination, or many other things arguably more harmful than particular violations of law or treaty. 94 There is, in short, something about
"legal regret" (by which I mean regret about the operation of the legal
system rather than cultural norms more generally) that helps trigger reparations. A positive theory of reparations obviously needs much more
than this, however, because there are numerous examples of legal reversals, such as overturned precedents and legislative switches, that do not
generate reparations.
The Indian Claims Act offers some useful lessons in public choice.
First, sympathy for a group is more likely if there remain live victims, and
it seems no accident that by 1946 most of the treaty-breaking horrors contemplated by the Act were sufficiently old that the last of the direct victims would soon pass away. A still more cynical way to make this observation is to note that once old losers pass from the scene, politicians lose
valuable opportunities to associate themselves with sympathetic causes.
The aging of the victim population was also a feature of the payments to
Japanese Americans and of recent payments to Holocaust victims by both
governments and non-government entities. Political energy seems to
burst forth when the players see that any further delay will result in a
reduction in public attention and political opportunities.
The aging of the victim population in so many cases where reparations are paid suggests other, complementary theories as well. Collective
action problems among claimants may be overcome as the time to press
claims grows short or the number of surviving victims shrinks. The passage of time may also create a situation in which the majority no longer
feels direct responsibility for the wrong that was done much earlier, and
this self-perception may somehow promote rather than interfere with the
inclination to make reparative payments. Most interesting, I think, is the
possibility that the majority declines to make payments early because
there is no guarantee that the victims will treat the payments as final.
Finality is more likely if the victim group will shortly disappear, and the
95
naturally decreasing size of the (disappearing) group does not hurt.
equivalent of $17,325 to each of approximately 12,000 surviving citizens uprooted and
deprived of property during World War II).
94. See 25 U.S.C. § 70a (1976) (repealed 1978).
95. I am indebted to Eric Posner, Jill Hasday, and Bill Landes (respectively) for the
ideas in this paragraph. Note that the decreasing size sometimes facilitates payments
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A different sort of observation about the Indian Claims Act is that it
did not offer payments to individuals but only to tribes or recognized
clans. 9 6 The stated reason for this constraint was that payments were for
wrongfully taken properties and these properties were not "owned" by
individuals, under customary tribal law, but rather concerned such things
as hunting rights that had traditionally belonged to tribes or to identifiable subsets of tribes.9 7 This reasoning seems too convenient, or even
politically correct: Lawyers and politicians have enough imagination to
assess damages for an individual's share of what had once been a collective asset. It seems useful, instead, to note the role of tribal leaders and
the Bureau of Indian Affairs in negotiating the political solution represented by the Act, and the interests of these parties in maintaining roles
for themselves. The Act transferred resources to the control of these parties for the purpose of allowing them to set up schools and other programs for Native Americans, creating jobs and various opportunities for
the very agents who negotiated the Act.98
The role of groups in these reparative schemes draws attention to
what I regard as the most interesting case related to payments under the
Indian Claims Act, McGhee ex rel. Creek Nation East of the Mississippi v. Creek
Nation.99 Under treaties signed in 1814, 1826, and 1832, the United
States obtained land in Georgia and Alabama by offering the residents,
members of the Creek tribe, a choice between staying on the land as U.S.
citizens or moving as a community to Oklahoma where their delegates
would be able to choose new land. 10 0 Some Creeks stayed and some endured a relocation to Oklahoma.10 ' Subsequent legislation provided that
the Oklahoma, or western, branch would be the only successor of the
tribal interest and it became known as the Creek Nation. 10 2 But years
simply because a smaller group is less expensive to pay. But inasmuch as payments
sometimes go to surviving victims or their families, I do not make too much of this variable.
96. See 25 U.S.C. § 70a (1976) (repealed 1978).
97. See McGhee ex rel. Creek Nation East of the Mississippi v. Creek Nation, 122 Ct.
Cl. 380, 392 (1952) ("[A] claim for the taking of tribal lands is a common claim, the
ownership of the land being tribal and not individual.").
98. The same is true for payments made at the state level to tribes and for resolutions
regarding the return of lands. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1701-75 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). Many of
these transfers have been made while the tribal claims were very much alive in the courts
and they do not, therefore, qualify as reparations under the definition used here. See, e.g.,
Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 666-67 (1974); Joint Tribal
Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370, 376 (1st Cir. 1975). This
definition, it will be recalled, looks to payments where no legal obligation is expected and
where there is regret for past wrongs (thus excluding voluntary payments in the form of

disaster relief, for example).
99. 122 Ct. Cl. 380 (1952).
100. See id. at 384.
101. See id. at 384-85.
102. See Act of Apr. 26, 1906, ch. 1876, 34 Stat. 137 (establishing permanent, closed
records of membership in the Creek tribe); Act of Mar. 1, 1901, ch. 675, 31 Star. 861, 862
(defining the Creek tribe as "the Muskogee [Creek] Nation or Muskogee Tribe of Indians
in Indian Territory") (emphasis added); McGhee, 122 Ct. Cl. at 385-86.
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later, and following the 1946 Act, the Creek Nation brought a claim
03
about the original and coercive acquisition of their southeastern lands.'
The Greek Nation (West) and their allies in the federal government argued that any settlement should go to the western tribal entity because
(as just discussed) the Act gives standing only to tribes or clans, not to
individuals, and by past agreement the western branch is the only successor of tribal interests. 10 4 The obvious public choice, or simply due process, argument is that the easterners were no less wronged and that they
had no voice in selecting the western leadership. The court's decision
was to allow the easterners a chance to organize separately and to form a
tribal group of their own. 10 5 Again, the position of the federal bureaucracy may at first be surprising, if only because we would think that defendants would prefer for plaintiffs to face collective action problems, but
it is less so once account is taken of the symbiotic relationship between
this bureaucracy and that of organized tribes, especially with regard to
infusions of cash.
It is unsurprising, I think, that many other reparations programs contain similar elements. Reparations immediately following World War II
were paid not only to individual survivors of the Holocaust but also to
Israel. 10 6 Recent international bargains with Swiss banks and German insurers have also provided for payments to groups whose leaders were involved in the bargaining itself. These payments can be thought of as reparative because it is unlikely that courts would have found liability. In
the case of assets entrusted to Swiss banks before and during World War
II, for example, serious negotiations some fifty years earlier had
culminated in an accord under which further claims of this sort were said
to have been waived. 10 7 Here, as with most claims and settlements, there
has been room to argue that the parties were misinformed or deliberately
misled in the earlier negotiations. However, these imperfections do not
seem to rise to the level normally required for a claim of duress or for
otherwise reopening what was once closed.' 0 8 On the other hand, the
payments followed substantial political and economic pressure exerted by
U.S. groups and jurisdictions with some leverage over the parties who
eventually agreed to make payments. 10 9
My point here is not to pass normative judgments on these old
claims, on those brought against German insurers for life insurance bene103. See McGhee, 122 Ct. Cl. at 382.
104. See id. at 390.
105. See id. at 394-95.
106. See Balabkins, supra note 83, at 143; see also Bittker, supra note 71, at 179-80
(discussing German legislation regarding reparations to individuals).
107. Cf. Detlev F. Vagts, Restitution for Historic Wrongs, the American Courts and
International Law, 92 Am. J. Int'l L. 232, 234-35 (1998) (comparing merits of American
and European rules regarding recovery of property stolen during wartime).
108. Cf. id. at 233 (noting difficulty of raising claims generally).
109. See John M. Goshko, 3 Swiss Banks Agree to Negotiate Settlement of Holocaust
Claims, Wash. Post, Mar. 27, 1998, at A18.
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fits never paid for lack of official death certificates (or because of "acts of
war"), or on those brought against German firms for their willing and
even aggressive use of slave labor during World War II.110 All these
claims deserve more discussion than is appropriate here. Still, the timing
of these claims, the continuing role played by mediating groups, and the
long-settled quality of the behavior and legal change at issue is
noteworthy.
An interesting example of reparations that seems quite different
from others noted here is the practice in some states of compensating
"wrongfully" incarcerated persons. Thus, Virginia has the practice of paying $50,000 per year for misimprisonment, although there is no legal requirement that such reparations be made. A legislative committee generally follows this pattern in making recommendations which are then
approved by legislative vote without much ado: If the error appears to
have been caused not by overzealous police and prosecutors but rather by
a dishonest or mistaken private witness, then the state can decline to
pay."' The practice of payments for mistaken or wrongful incarceration
is known in other legal systems as well." 2 These payments to individual
citizens are different in that they involve recently uncovered events and
are paid neither to organized groups nor in a way that benefits group
leaders who negotiate the payments. But I would describe these payments as more on the order of a sensible waiver of sovereign immunity
(accompanied by a monetary settlement) than as a classic example of reparations. Regret is felt for something in the recent past, but the payment
is to a new winner who already has a great incentive to avoid incarceration in the first place, and, once incarcerated, to work for a change in the
law. Indeed, if this is wrong it is because ex post payments might offer
lawyers a potential source of remuneration, so that wrongfully incarcerated persons will have better access to legal services. But for the most
part, the original wrong and the subsequent change are unilaterally in
110. See generally Benjamin B. Ferencz, Less than Slaves (1979), for a discussion of
earlier failures to recover. Note also the inability of firms even long after the original acts
to make payments, or settlements, without bringing forth new claimants. There is, for
instance, no shortage of survivors who could bring claims against German wartime
manufacturers. A fuller exploration of current claims and recoveries against German firms
must await a separate effort.
111. The state has waffled on this practice in the past. See Mike Allen, Virginia
Pardons Itself forJailing an Innocent Man, Wash. Post, Feb. 18, 1997, at Al; Mike Allen &
Spencer Hsu, Virginia Senate Votes to Pay Wronged Man, Wash. Post, Feb. 20, 1997, at D1;
Mike Allen, Virginia Senate Forced to Backtrack on Paying Wronged Man, Wash. Post, Feb.
21, 1997, at D3.
112. See Paul G. Cassell, Criminal Law: Protecting the Innocent from False

Confessions and Lost Confessions-and from Miranda, 88J. Grim. L. & Criminology 497,
522 n.128 (1998) ("[I]n Britain an average of seven persons a year receive compensation
for wrongful imprisonment."); Hans Gameltoft-Hansen, Compensation for Unjustified
Imprisonment in Danish Law, 18 Scandinavian Stud. in L. 27-70 (1974). Note, however,
that payments are rarely made for regretted arrests or negligent shootings of innocents by
police officers where there is no singling out of victims.
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the hands of the government and it is possible that the expectation of
liability (and associated public attention) serves to rein in prosecutors
and police who are too enthusiastic in their pursuit of defendants. In
short, the simple internalization argument fits here, and the anticipationoriented approach argues for rather than against payments. The payments have more to do with content than with timing, but the timing
issues support the convention of payments.
Other notable examples of payments to groups reflect the themes
developed here, including regret, long-settled change, some striking
political advantage of the beneficiary group, and the focal point provided
by the aging of the victim group. In 1993, Florida paid a few million
dollars to survivors of a group of citizens who were driven from the town
of Rosewood in 1923, after eight black citizens were murdered and all
black residents' homes were burned by marauding whites from neighboring towns." 3 Law enforcement officials stood by and did nothing during
and after what became known as the Rosewood Massacre. 1 14 The payments were labeled as compensation for takings and were paid to nine
survivors. 1 15 A fund was set up to compensate later claimants who could
prove they had lost property, and a separate scholarship fund offered priority to Rosewood descendants." 6 The timing of these reparations
caused observers to suggest that the Governor's support for these payments was motivated in part by a desire to obtain reciprocal support for a
117
health care bill.
Similar claims might be made regarding payments offered by the
U.S. government under the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act of
1990 to residents of three western states who had developed any of thirteen listed cancers and who were present during secret (and perhaps
careless) testing of atom bombs between 1951 and 1958, or for a short
period in 1962.118 The Act offered $50,000 to each eligible person." 9 It
also paid $100,000 to any uranium miner who had developed certain diseases and who had specified exposures between 1947 and 1971 in any of
four western states. 120 The United States had avoided liability in litigation over nondisclosure and over using "downwinders" as "guinea pigs"
113. See Michael D'Orso, Like Judgment Day 1-11, 206-20 (1996) (describing
Rosewood Massacre and reparation efforts); Florida Will Pay Black Survivors of White-Mob
Rampage in Town, L.A. Times, Apr. 9, 1994, at A21 (reporting final settlement).
114. See C. Jeanne Bassett, Comment, House Bill 591: Florida Compensates
Rosewood Victims and Their Families for a Seventy-One-Year-Old Injury, 22 Fla. St. U. L.
Rev. 503, 506-07 (1994).
115. See id. at 517.
116. See id. at 517-18.
117. See id. at 512; Bill Moss, Tempers Flare in Meeting About the Rosewood Bill, St.
Petersburg Times, Apr. 1, 1994, at lB.
118. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 note (1994) (Radiation Exposure Compensation).
119. See id.
120. See id.

HeinOnline -- 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1697 1999

1698

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99:1657

because testing programs and related decisions fit within its discretionary
12
function. '
There are obviously many other comparable cases of regret where
there was official wrongdoing, asjudged by later moral or legal standards,
that escapes liability because of sovereign immunity, statutes of limitations, and other defensive devices that are available even when public
opinion becomes sympathetic to the victims of the earlier wrongdoing.
As with so many other things that are associated with interest groups, it is
difficult to say why some groups organize and others do not, and also
difficult to know when organized groups will succeed. 122 The theory advanced here may not be testable. I might continue to advance examples
of payments where time had gone by and further change was unlikely,
but there is, of course, an enormous number of cases where governments
pay for recent wrongs, and it is difficult to distinguish settlements from
voluntary payments. I prefer, therefore, to emphasize the implications of
the anticipation-oriented approach and to suggest as an afterthought that
we might, if we like, understand some reparative payments as not inconsistent with this view and as predictable, if at all, with tools associated with
public choice.
C. Reparationsand Rent-Seeking
I have described reparations as a kind of exception to the pattern of
transition rules. To the extent that reparations are made long after some
event or use of law, the old law is regretted for a long period of time, new
law on the matter is well-settled, and recovery then hinges on the political
position of those aggrieved under old law (whose present position was
hard to forecast long ago). It seems unlikely that reparations thus defined could have much influence on legal change. I have suggested that
public choice considerations might explain when this matter, now beyond influence, leads to payments, but a better use of public choice tools
might be to suggest that if reparations do not sort out according to some
functional or moral theory, then perhaps it would be better that they not
be paid.' 2 3 The idea is that the possibility of reparative payments will
bring forth rent-seeking by groups interested in obtaining payments, and
that these lobbying, litigating, and fundraising efforts can be thought of
as wasteful. This idea is obviously normative; as a positive matter we do
find instances of reparative payments.
There are two reasons to be skeptical of this approach. The first is
that reparations and legal regret have expressive or educational value
121. William A. Fletcher, Atomic Bomb Testing and the Warner Amendment: A
Violation of the Separation of Powers, 65 Wash. L. Rev. 285, 298-303 & n.81 (1990).
Compare the difficulties of the geographically dispersed miners with the cases of the
geographically concentrated groups discussed supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
122. See Levmore, Voting Paradoxes, supra note 49, at 272.
123. We would not make payments mandatory for fear that good law would face
unnecessary obstacles. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
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that is difficult to assess. A society that revisits, apologizes, and pays for
past wrongs-even if it ignores some of its most serious past wrongsteaches its members something about law and shared values. Some
amount of hunting for reparations might therefore provide a social
12 4
good.
The second reason is more practical. There are a number of loosely
related difficulties with an attempt to precommit not to make compensatory or reparative payments. First, it would take some time to build up a
sufficient norm that could keep an eager government from making a payment that was politically useful. Moreover, there is no easy way to distinguish such payments from others the government might make. Reparations can be framed as incentives, especially where past victims are now
geographically, professionally, or otherwise concentrated. Similarly, the
hurdle to setting forth a testable theory of reparations reappears. Politicians can insist that reparations are not voluntary transfers at all, but
rather sensible payments in the form of a settlement of a claim that might
well prove more costly to the government in court or keep the legislature
unnecessarily distracted.
CONCLUSION

Timely lawmaking, of both the judicial and legislative kind, is the
product of at least three groups of actors. These include governments
(however conceived), interest groups that favor change, and interest
groups that were winners under the previous legal regime and can be
thought of as opposing change. There is no shortage of other citizens
and interest groups, but it is enough to focus for the present on these
three kinds of players. I have suggested that as a positive as well as a
normative matter we might think of transition rules as attempting to encourage all three of these groups to facilitate change that will come to be
seen as good law.
The more one thinks that the last of these three groups, those who
profit from the status quo, is the key to good change or the appropriate
least cost avoider, then the more one is inclined toward a policy of aggressive change. Protecting these new losers in the event of change ruins
their incentive to anticipate good change. But the more we expand the
perspective offered by the anticipation-oriented approach to include a
role for new winners who develop evidence, invest in the political arena,
or litigate for change, the more we may wish to spread the available incentives among both new losers and new winners. Once we take this
step-and once we adopt any of a number of plausible and time-honored
reasons for limiting the role of monetary incentives as a means of influencing legislatures, courts, and regulators-conventional legal rules appear remarkably sensible. The strategy of aggressive change, and its focus
124. Some of the tensions arising out of this sort of view are developed in compelling
fashion in Minow, supra note 77, at 91-117.
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on anticipatory behavior, begins as a radical approach but can end up
supporting the very rules we know and associate with fairness and
reliance.
The expanded anticipation-oriented approach can also illuminate
specific areas of law. I have suggested that much of takings law might be
understood as reflecting concern with anticipation. The government is
asked to pay when condemnees are in an especially poor position to facilitate new law. In contrast, most regulated parties go uncompensated
where compensation would discourage anticipation and earlier adjustment to new, good law.
A second application involves payments that can loosely be organized under the label of reparations but that also include (apparent) decisions against offering such payments. In most settings, government payments might well interfere with the prospect of good legal change, but
when change has come long ago and the law (and sense of regret) is
fairly stable, reparations can be paid with little fear of influencing
change. There may be value in this form of social expression and there
may simply be political gain from reparations. Considerations normally
associated with public choice do seem to explain some striking examples
of reparative payments.
The anticipation-oriented approach to transition rules, at least as analyzed here, points not to one but to several players, all of whom influence the substance and rate of change. The government is one of these
players, and although it could be encouraged with much the same rules
as the others, it is perhaps sensible that often it is not. Compensable
takings and reparations then emerge as two foils to the general pattern of
regulating change. These exceptions may well prove the rule, in which
case we have yet another example of a positive, descriptive theory of law,
somewhat mysterious in development, that is at the same time normatively tenable.
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